Fair social orderings for the sharing of international rivers: A leximin based approach

Öztürk, Z. Emel

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102302

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…For instance, Raupach et al [34] and Du Pont et al [15] assume a 2 degree Celsius target on global warming and investigate the economic effects of allocation mechanisms con- 2 It is also worth noting that, in contrast to some of the literature that models IEAs with the use of repeated or dynamic games with stocks (e.g., Dutta and Radner [16], Harstad [24,25]), our framework is static. While this is consistent with much previous work in both the axiomatic and non-axiomatic strands of the literature (e.g., [1,2,4,3,11,6,12,13,40,39,32,30,18,33]), the dynamic nature of most stock externalities means that it is an assumption that merits attention. For example, Harstad [25] shows that under certain conditions short-term environmental agreements can be considerably less effective than longer-term ones.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Problems inspired by water allocation provide a small but meaningful counterpoint to the above body of work. Ambec and Sprumont [1], Ambec and Ehlers [2], Ansink and Weikard [4,5], Van den Brink et al [39] and Ozturk [33] all employ axiomatic approaches to study the properties of different water-sharing schemes. Broadly speaking, this strand of the literature blends axiomatic analysis with cooperative game theory to study the normative properties of transboundary water agreements.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements

Athanasoglou

2022

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements

Athanasoglou

2022

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

2020

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We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region's responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al., 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity.

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Fair allocation rules for the commons—informing water policy design through survey methods

Kervinio,

Ouvrard,

Reynaud

2024

Soc Choice Welf

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We set up an original framework aiming to produce robust and transferable knowledge on fairness attitudes towards water sharing arrangements. Using a simple axiomatic approach, we demonstrate how different conceptions of common and private property over a natural resource translate into contrasting allocation rules. We then apply this framework to investigate the potential justification of collective arrangements for irrigation water. Using a survey on farmers in South-Western France, we investigate stakeholders’ attitudes toward different allocations and their underlying justification. Our results highlight the need to study existing attitudes both at the different level of generality and beyond the opposition between solidarity and responsibility principles. We also observe a strong attachment to historical rights and a rejection of water exchanges, potentially signaling a strong attachment to the status quo or procedural concerns, such as the right to self-organize. Additionally, our results suggest the potential for individual attitudes to change through reasoning or framing. Finally, we discuss how questionnaire studies could provide valuable insights about shared values in a community, and support the design of robust common-pool resource institutions.

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Fair social orderings for the sharing of international rivers: A leximin based approach

Cited by 5 publications

References 50 publications

On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements

On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements

Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

Fair allocation rules for the commons—informing water policy design through survey methods

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