Fairness Between Competing Claims

Saunders, Ben

doi:10.1007/s11158-010-9118-y

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…See e.g. Stone 2007;Saunders 2010. In this work, I will, however, subscribe to the more commonly accepted view of "careers open to talents".…”

Section: The Rawlsian Framework Of Fair Equality Of Opportunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

Vitikainen¹

2015

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Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism is a work in normative political philosophy. In particular, it is a work on liberal approaches to cultural diversity. The work assesses some of the benefits and limitations of liberal multiculturalism (broadly conceived) and develops a more individuated, yet culturally sensitive, approach to cultural diversity. The two main parts of the work discuss the normative justifications and rationales for differentiated rights within liberalism (Part I) and the more practical problems of applying these rights in practice (Part II).The first three chapters (Part I) analyse the so-called autonomy-, toleration-and equality-based approaches to cultural diversity as presented by Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas and Brian Barry. This part argues that the autonomy-, toleration-and equality-based approaches provide frameworks within which the liberal responses to cultural diversity should reside, but fail to give any definitive guidance into how the liberal state should react to cultural diversity in particular circumstances. These approaches leave a substantive scope of variation to the cultural policies of the liberal state, including the possibility, albeit not a requirement, to grant differentiated rights.The three latter chapters (Part II) develop a more individuated, yet culturally sensitive, approach to cultural diversity by concentrating on the further issues of allocating differentiated rights. The first chapter (Ch. 4) highlights the difficulties of defining one's membership in a cultural group and argues that, in order to track their targets, the individually exercised differentiated rights should be allocated in accordance with need or selfidentification. Chapter 5 develops the individual-centred approach further by concentrating on the issues of the right of exit, and the liberal state's responses to those who have decided to leave the contours of their group without rejecting their identity as a member. The final chapter (Ch. 6) focuses on the legal-theoretical debate on allowing cultural defence in criminal courts and gives an ii application of the individuated approach in the criminal justice system.The main claims of the work are that the liberal multiculturalists have been successful in clarifying the grounds upon which the liberal responses to cultural diversity should reside and in showing that the culturally differentiated rights (variously construed) are not necessarily incompatible with liberalism. The liberal multicultural theories do not, however, give any definitive guidance on how the liberal state should respond to cultural diversity, nor do they always take sufficiently into account the variations within (and without) cultural groups. The work rejects the common assumption of differentiated rights as specifically group-differentiated rights, and argues for a more individuated approach that, nevertheless, takes people's cultural commitments and their group identities seriously.

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“…See e.g. Stone 2007;Saunders 2010. In this work, I will, however, subscribe to the more commonly accepted view of "careers open to talents".…”

Section: The Rawlsian Framework Of Fair Equality Of Opportunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

Vitikainen¹

2015

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“…We introduce the claims approach and the games approach to fair division and explain that both approaches can be used to model fair division problems such as Problem I and II. Ever since Broome's seminal paper on fairness (Broome 1990), fair division problems are modelled as claims problems in the philosophical literature (see Hooker 2005;Saunders 2010;Tomlin 2012;Curtis 2014or Piller 2017 for an overview). However, by drawing on O'Neill (1982), we observe that the very same fair division problems can also be modelled as cooperative games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of Fairness and Aggregation

Wintein

Heilmann

2018

Erkenn

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We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders (Utilitas 27:460-469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative game theory, that do not face the problem of non-aggregativity. We use this observation to argue that the universal claim that no non-trivial theory of fairness can guarantee aggregativity is false. Paseau and Saunders's mistaken assertion can be understood as arising from a neglect of the (cooperative) games approach to fair division. Our treatment has two further payoffs: for one, we give an accessible introduction to the (cooperative) games approach to fair division, whose significance has hitherto not been appreciated by philosophers working on fairness. For another, our discussion explores the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems in a comprehensive fashion.

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“… 1. Tomlin (2012) and Kirkpatrick & Eastwood (2015) argue against the core feature of Broome’s account, that is, against the characterization of fairness as the proportional satisfaction of claims. Hooker (2005) and Saunders (2010) argue that fairness is not a strictly comparative value. …”

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confidence: 99%

“… 2. Kirkpatrick & Eastwood (2015), Lazenby (2014), Henning (2015), Hooker (2005), Saunders (2010), and Vong (2015) all argue, in one way or another, that Broome misconceives the relation between fairness and weighted lotteries. …”

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confidence: 99%

Dividing the indivisible

Wintein¹,

Heilmann

2017

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.

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Fairness Between Competing Claims

Cited by 21 publications

References 27 publications

The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

Theories of Fairness and Aggregation

Dividing the indivisible

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