Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence

Three Arguments to Think that Faith Does Not Entail Belief

“…By my lights, the answer is yes (2013, p. 368, and 2017a; cf. Buchak, ). Faith renders you resilient in the face of challenges to living in light of its propositional object, and it serves this role partly by responding to new counterevidence to it.…”

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends

“…While doxasticists insist that faith that p entails belief that p , non-doxasticists allow that some attitude other than belief that p can play the role that doxasticists assign to belief that p . Among the attitudes that some non-doxasticists allow are doxastic attitudes such us belief that p is likely, or belief that p is more likely than not, or belief that p is significantly more likely than each of p ’s credible contraries, etc., as well as non-doxastic attitudes such as propositional acceptance (Alston (1996), (2007) ), propositional trust (Audi (2011); McKaughan (2013), (2016), (2017) ), propositional reliance (Rath (2017) ), propositional hope (McKaughan (2013); Pojman (1986) ), imaginative assent (Schellenberg (2005), (2013) ), credence (Buchak (2012), (2017a), (2017b); Sliwa (forthcoming) ), and beliefless assuming (Golding (1990), Howard-Snyder (2013), (2016), (2017a), (2017b); Swinburne (1981/2005) ).…”

Faith and hope in situations of epistemic uncertainty

“…This could be contrasted with the view of Lara Buchak – who, like Schellenberg, holds that faith requires closing one's investigation. According to Buchak, a faith commitment is generally made only after one has made a thorough investigation and, through that investigation, determined a reasonably high posterior probability for the proposition one has faith in (Buchak (2017), 120–123). Schellenberg requires nothing of the sort.…”

“…6.For an account of faith that even takes the ending of enquiry to be its defining feature, see Buchak (2012), 2017.…”