Fake Barns and False Dilemmas

Littlejohn, Clayton

doi:10.1017/epi.2014.24

Cited by 75 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…Like Sosa (), I think there might well be knowledge in fake barn cases. Alternatively, like Millar () and Littlejohn (), one might doubt that the accuracy of our beliefs does manifest our relevant visual‐recognitional ability in such cases, and hence doubt that we see that there is a barn as opposed to bearing the simple seeing relation to the state of affairs of there being a barn . Similar points apply to the second argument, which assumes that one can see that p even if one's justification for believing p is defeated.…”

Section: Three Direct Arguments For Non‐normativismmentioning

confidence: 95%

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation

Sylvan

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to a view I'll call Epistemic Normativism (EN), knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification (the "Entailment Thesis"). I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis and argue that a non-normativist picture provides the best explanation of all the intuitions surrounding this thesis, favorable and unfavorable. On this picture, human knowledge is a structured non-normative complex that has as one of its parts a justification-making property, analogous in role to goodmaking properties like pleasurableness. After giving three arguments against EN in §3 and answering an objection in §4, I turn in §5 to further develop the positive view sketched in §2. In §6, I take stock and conclude.

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Section: Three Direct Arguments For Non‐normativismmentioning

confidence: 95%

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation

Sylvan

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…A thief knocked the bucket over clumsily, saw the stones spilled across the floor, saw that the bucket was labeled diamonds, and grabbed the first stone that she could believing it to be a diamond. She left the others because she thought that she heard someone 21 I used to think he was right, but I now think that it's not for reasons discussed in Littlejohn (2014). Like Carter (2013) and Jarvis (2013), I'm skeptical of the idea that the environmental luck cases are cases in which the correctness of your predication is attributable to the exercise of your abilities.…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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“…In particular, in the situation (IC) where Audrey is out of coffee, she believes that she is out of coffee, she has 23 In more recent writings Littlejohn has changed his views on this. For one thing, in Littlejohn (2014) he argues that environmental luck Gettier cases do not pose a problem for the R ! K thesis.…”

Section: Icmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In more recent writings Littlejohn has changed his views on this. For one thing, in Littlejohn () he argues that environmental luck Gettier cases do not pose a problem for the R → K thesis. Moreover, he explicitly endorses R → K in Littlejohn (): “The evidence you have consists of those facts that you have the right to treat as a reason for forming further beliefs.…”

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confidence: 99%