False Data Injection Attacks Against Synchronization Systems in Microgrids

Mohamed, Amr; Arani, Mohammadreza Fakhari Moghaddam; Jahromi, Amir Abiri; Kundur, Deepa

doi:10.1109/tsg.2021.3080693

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The authors of Ref. [38] discusses how the synchronisation processes in micro grids enable cyber vulnerabilities and allows attackers to execute FDI attacks with severe consequences. In the paper, they design and demonstrate exploits in the system resonance to influence the microgrid frequency to rapidly trip a generator causing the grid to shutdown prematurely.…”

Section: Background Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross‐layered distributed data‐driven framework for enhanced smart grid cyber‐physical security

et al. 2022

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Smart Grid (SG) research and development has drawn much attention from academia, industry and government due to the great impact it will have on society, economics and the environment. Securing the SG is a considerably significant challenge due the increased dependency on communication networks to assist in physical process control, exposing them to various cyber-threats. In addition to attacks that change measurement values using False Data Injection (FDI) techniques, attacks on the communication network may disrupt the power system's real-time operation by intercepting messages, or by flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data. Addressing these attacks requires a cross-layer approach. In this paper a cross-layered strategy is presented, called Cross-Layer Ensemble CorrDet with Adaptive Statistics(CECD-AS), which integrates the detection of faulty SG measurement data as well as inconsistent network inter-arrival times and transmission delays for more reliable and accurate anomaly detection and attack interpretation. Numerical results show that CECD-AS can detect multiple False Data Injections, Denial of Service (DoS) and Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks with a high F1-score compared to current approaches that only use SG measurement data for detection such as the traditional physics-based State Estimation, ECD-AS strategy and other machine learning classification-based detection schemes.

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Section: Background Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross‐layered distributed data‐driven framework for enhanced smart grid cyber‐physical security

et al. 2022

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“…2) In the existing resilient control of MG for mitigating FDI attacks, false data detection methods are considered [14] - [18]. However, the stealthiness of FDI attacks makes them difficult to be detected.…”

Section: E Prominent Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are also some research works related to distributed MG control under FDI attacks. Reference [14] presents an analytical framework for conducting effective FDI cyberattacks targeting MGs with synchronous generators. In [15], an effective FDI detection method based on the Kullback-Liebler divergence-based criterion is proposed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three-stage Defensive Framework for Distributed Microgrid Control Against Cyberattacks

Xiao

Zhou

Wang

et al. 2022

Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy

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With the wide integration of various distributed communication and control techniques, the cyber-physical microgrids face critical challenges raised by the emerging cyberattacks. This paper proposes a three-stage defensive framework for distributed microgrids against denial of service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) attacks, including resilient control， communication network reconfiguration, and switching of local control. The resilient control in the first stage is capable of tackling simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks when the connectivity of communication network could be maintained under cyberattacks. The communication network reconfiguration method in the second stage and the subsequent switching of local control in the third stage based on the software-defined network (SDN) layer aim to cope with the network partitions caused by cyberattacks. The proposed defensive framework could effectively mitigate the impacts of a wide range of simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks in microgrids without requiring the specific assumptions of attacks and prompt detections, which would not incorporate additional cyberattack risks. Extensive case studies using a 13-bus microgrid system are conducted to validate the effectiveness of the proposed three-stage defensive framework against the simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks.

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“…The authors in [4] presented resonance attacks, in which the attacker corrupts power demand signals to induce unstable frequency oscillations that falsely trigger rate-of-change of frequency (ROCOF) relays deployed to protect generation equipment from operating in unsafe frequency. Similarly, to trip ROCOF protection, authors in [5] compromised microgrid synchronization, and authors in [6] compromised the control of loads providing emulated inertia services. Targeting the false operation of under-frequency load shedding (UFLS) relays, the authors in [7] manipulated the frequency measurements used in wide-area UFLS schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Use of Safety Critical Control for Cyber-Physical Security in the Smart Grid

Mohamed¹,

Khalaf²,

Kundur³

2023

Preprint

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The tight coupling between communication and control in cyber-physical systems is necessary to enable the complex regulation required to operate these systems. Unfortunately, cyberattackers can exploit network vulnerabilities to compromise communication and force unsafe decision-making and dynamics. If a cyberattack is not detected and isolated in a timely manner, the control process must balance adhering to the received measurement signals to maintain system operation and ensuring that temporary compromise of the signals does not force unsafe dynamics. For this purpose, we present and employ a safety critical controller based on control barrier functions to mitigate attacks against load frequency control in smart power grids. We validate the paper's findings using simulation on a high-fidelity testbed.

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False Data Injection Attacks Against Synchronization Systems in Microgrids

Cited by 27 publications

References 31 publications

Cross‐layered distributed data‐driven framework for enhanced smart grid cyber‐physical security

Cross‐layered distributed data‐driven framework for enhanced smart grid cyber‐physical security

Three-stage Defensive Framework for Distributed Microgrid Control Against Cyberattacks

On the Use of Safety Critical Control for Cyber-Physical Security in the Smart Grid

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