Farmer Cooperation in Participatory Irrigation in South Asia: Insights from Game Theory

Abstract

Participatory irrigation, where farmers are given greater control and management responsibility, has been a topic of controversy for many years. Initially seen as a panacea for dealing with weaknesses in state-run irrigation, participatory irrigation has generated mixed results, especially in South Asia. Part of the challenge of understanding the conditions that promote and undermine participatory irrigation is that it is seldom deployed in the same way. For example, irrigation fees collected by farmers are not handled in the same manner, even within a single country. In some instances, a large portion of collected monies is retained locally and in others, only a small portion is kept for local use. In this paper, we use game theory to contemplate how the portion of irrigation fees retained locally might impact on the effectiveness of participatory irrigation. We show that there are multiple plausible equilibria, and that allowing farmers to retain more funds locally might shift behaviour from an uncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative outcome. However, we also find that it is unlikely for there to be a singular fix and we use empirical evidence to demonstrate the conundrums of making participatory irrigation sustainable.

Analysing Irrigation Farmers’ Preferences for Local Governance Using a Discrete Choice Experiment in India and Pakistan

“…Others have posited that retaining revenues locally in participatory irrigation management can engender greater compliance by farmers but simultaneously found that compliance itself requires the support of the state/provincial government (see, [22]). Similar complicated interactions are evident in this preference data.…”

“…With this in mind, this study drew upon evidence in two states in east India-Assam and Bihar-and two provinces in Pakistan-Punjab and Sindh. The hydrological and agricultural setting for these case sites is reported in Hone et al [22].…”

Editorial—Using Applied Economics to Study Participatory Irrigation Institutions and their Impact in South Asia

“…The key finding from this ambitious work was that there is considerable diversity of preferences across and within jurisdictions. As with Hone et al [13], Burton, Cooper, and Crase [14] conclude that there is no simple universal panacea to enhancing the performance of PIM and understanding the local setting is paramount.…”

“…Diverting from the empirical modelling of institutional survey data, Hone et al [13] harness the rationale embodied in game theory to specifically consider what would motivate farmers to be more compliant with rules established under PIM. By contemplating the farmer's decision as a potential payoff matrix, they identify both cooperative and uncooperative equilibria.…”

Improvement of Tertiary Irrigation Networks, Changes in Cropping Patterns, and Increasing Cropping Index at Kendal Indonesia

“…However, we also find that it is unlikely to be a singular fix. We use empirical evidence to demonstrate the conundrums of making participatory irrigation sustainable [26]. Irrigation water can increase rice production, productivity, and farmers' revenue through the restoration of irrigation infrastructure, utilization of biological fertilizers, and proper management of irrigation systems.…”