Farmers’ Economic Status and Satisfaction with Homestead Withdrawal Policy: Expectation and Perceived Value

Abstract

The withdrawal of homesteads is an effective way to improve the efficiency of rural construction land use and is being piloted in many regions of China, but the mechanism influencing farmers’ satisfaction with the withdrawal policy is unclear. This paper aimed to investigate the relationships among farmers’ economic status (ES), policy expectation (PE), policy perceived value (PPV), and farmers’ satisfaction with homestead withdrawal policy (policy satisfaction; PS). The study examined the mediating effects of PE and PPV on the relationship between ES and PS. The data obtained from a questionnaire of 287 households in Jinhu County, Jiangsu Province, China. After surviving from reliability and validity tests, a structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables was specified and estimated using Mplus. From the study results, we found significant positive relationships between ES, PP, and PS, but significant negative relationships between ES, PE, PPV, and PS. Also, our research found PE and PPV as potential mediators on ES-PS relation. We propose recommendations from three aspects to improve farmers’ satisfaction with future implementations of the homestead withdrawal policy. Our results provided new insights into how to improve the performance of homestead withdrawal policy.

Using Marginal Land Resources to Solve the Shortage of Rural Entrepreneurial Land in China

“…Through a review of previous studies, we found that few works have analyzed issues relative to rural entrepreneurial construction land, and these studies have mainly focused on the status, policies, and other aspects. Some scholars have noticed that there are large amounts of wasteland and residential land in rural areas that have been extensively left idle for a long time [27][28][29][30][31][32]; however, there are no clear answers to how to use these marginal land resources to support rural entrepreneurship and development. In our study, we believe that the utilisation of idle land in rural areas, such as idle farmhouses, workshops, and school buildings, can be improved by innovative use and transformed into land for production, which is an effective way to alleviate the problem of land use for rural entrepreneurship.…”

Research hotspots and prospects of homestead withdrawal and reuse

“…农村宅基地按集体经济组织成员资格权进行 分配， 无偿获得、 无限期使用 [1] ， 是中国农村重要的 福利性土地制度安排， 为保障农民 "居有定所" 及农 村社会稳定发挥了重要作用 [2] [5,6] [21] ； 家庭抚 养子女数量、 宅基地退出风险预期、 区位条件、 宅基 地面积及使用收益、 农户产权认知等阻碍农户宅基 地退出意愿 [12,22] 。此外， 经济发展水平及农户所处 家庭生命周期阶段也影响农户宅基地退出意愿， 经 济发展水平越高， 农户退地时考虑的因素也越多， 尤其是其家庭的资产和财产性收入状况 [23] 。有学者 将农户家庭按生命周期划分为夫妇核心家庭、 成长 核心家庭， 成熟核心家庭、 扩大家庭Ⅰ、 扩大家庭Ⅱ Tian 等 [10] 、 Wu 等 [11] 、 Zhao 等 [12] 、 Zhang [13] 、 Lu 等 [14] 、 Gu 等 [15] 、 Kong 等 [16] 、 Lyu 等 [17] 、 Zhang 等 [18] 、 Tang 等 [19] 、 Song 等 [20] 第 43 卷 第 7 期 资 源 科 学 http://www.resci.net 和萎缩家庭 6 个阶段， 其退出意愿呈现先增加后降 低再增加的 "N" 形变化趋势， 成熟核心家庭和萎缩 家庭的退地意愿是 2 个高值段 [24] 。…”

“…(1) 激励与约束机制。构建积极的激励机制可 有效激发农户宅基地退出意愿， 促进其宅基地退出 行为 [12] 补偿方式， 以及完善社会保障体系、 制定就业优惠 政策等 [28] 。反向约束机制则通过较为严格的措施引 导农户将闲置及违建宅基地退出 [12] ， 例如增加农户 闲置宅基地的持有成本， 或以宅基地面积为标准采 用递增收费法倒逼农户退出宅基地 [29] 。…”

“…(2) 收益分配机制。收益分配机制的构建包括 设立宅基地发展权 [38] 、 提高农民的收益分配比重 [39] 、 引入收益分享机制 [40] 、 搭建 "增值分配" 宅基地整理 机制 [41] 、 建立长期收益分配机制 [42] 等措施， 重点是基 于农民、 村集体和政府之间的博弈协调各主体之间 的收益分配关系及比例 [18] 。宅基地退出收益分配比 例应与主体承担的风险成正比， 在退地过程中农户 的风险暴露度高于其他群体， 在收益分配中应给予 更高的比重， 如王兆林等 [43] [53] 。当前， 货 币补偿和实物补偿是宅基地退出补偿最直接的方 式 [12] 。货币补偿是将退出宅基地进行价值评估， 并 折算成现金补偿给农户 [12] ； 实物补偿则是通过评估 农户退出的宅基地， 交换城镇住房或重新分配宅基 地 [54] 。除货币、 实物等财产性补偿外， 还存在非财产 性福利补偿， 如就业安置、 养老保障、 购房优惠等 [55] 。 实践中各地一般结合多种补偿方式以提升农户宅 基地退出积极性 [11,56] ， 例如安徽金寨 "货币+宅基地" 补偿、 天津蓟州 "货币+购房补贴" 等， 均为典型的组 合型补偿方式 [57] 。此外， 有学者从地区差异角度， 建 议经济发展相对滞后地区以现金补偿为主， 经济较 发达地区以实物补偿为主 [58] 。 4.4 宅基地退出模式 学者结合实地调研和农户问卷调查提炼各地 实践的典型宅基地退出模式特征 [59,60] ， 剖析了不同 模式的功能及成效 [61] 。 表 2 退出宅基地价值测算 [63] 。 "双放弃" 模式是农户将宅基地使用权和 耕地承包经营权分别换取城镇住房和城镇社会保 障 [64] 。 "集地券" 模式是将农村零星建设用地复垦， 待 验收后转为建设用地指标 [65] 。…”

Multi-party game and simulation in the withdrawal of rural homestead: evidence from China

“…Some studies have reviewed the process through related institutional changes (Wu et al , 2018). Some others have assessed the appropriate compensation for peasants in WRH (Zhao et al , 2020). Yet others have assessed factors influencing peasants' willingness to withdraw from their homestead (Chen et al , 2017).…”