Farmers, trust, and the market solution to water pollution: The role of social embeddedness in water quality trading

Mariola, Matthew J.

doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.09.007

Cited by 37 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Knowing something about the nature of these costs could help reduce the AP. For example, building trust makes information more believable to farmers and reduces the risk that farmers may perceive in participating in the trading scheme [22]. Lack of trust is a temporary issue and can be reduced or eliminated by policy makers if they start building a link between the involved parties before implementing the targeted policy.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of Conservation Adoption Premiums on Participation in Water Quality Trading Programs

Motallebi

O’Connell

Hoag

et al. 2016

Water

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Over half of lakes, reservoirs, and ponds in the United States are threatened or impaired, mostly by nutrients. One policy to improve water quality is water quality trading (WQT). While the concept is appealing, adoption of conservation practices in these programs has been anemic at best. Using a case study in the newly-formed WQT market in Jordan Lake, North Carolina, we propose that part of the problem is a large adoption premium (AP) for this program. AP is the amount that farmers require over and above direct adoption costs to participate. In this study, farmers were asked at in-person interviews about their willingness to accept (WTA) a payment to adopt a particular conservation practice (riparian buffers) in order to generate and sell credits. We compared farmers' WTA to their direct cost of participation, which allowed us to estimate an AP. On average, the AP more than doubles the cost of purchasing credits. The AP sums all of the known indirect costs already cited in the literature, and more, into a single value and is relatively simple to estimate. Knowing the AP would improve the ability of policy makers to accurately estimate what is needed to boost adoption rates in WQT programs and other conservation programs as well.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of Conservation Adoption Premiums on Participation in Water Quality Trading Programs

Motallebi

O’Connell

Hoag

et al. 2016

Water

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“…Street-level bureaucrats do not operate in isolation, but rather are embedded in a complex social and political network containing many intermediaries and various levels of trust, directly influencing whether and how these bureaucrats implement policy [17,27]. Distrust of government officials (particularly regarding the risk of added regulatory burden) is a common dilemma for VIPs in our case study.…”

Section: Anti-government Sentiment and The Role Of Trusted Proxiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Program managers were very aware of the potential to dissuade otherwise-interested landowners in VIPs simply by their agency status. This distrust stems mainly from a fear of exposure to additional regulations or restrictions (a regulatory "Trojan Horse" [27], or suspicion regarding program manager or their proxy's true motives.…”

Section: Anti-government Sentiment and The Role Of Trusted Proxiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Failure to Communicate: Inefficiencies in Voluntary Incentive Programs for Private Forest Owners in Michigan

Rouleau

Lind-Riehl

Smith

et al. 2016

Forests

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Abstract:Coordinating forest management across thousands of nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners is a difficult yet necessary task for state land management agencies. Voluntary Incentive Programs (VIPs) can coordinate the decentralized activities of these owners in return for services or financial incentives. However, many VIPs typically have low enrollment. Our study investigates the implementation of VIPs to increase forest management coordination among NIPFs in Michigan. We present findings from 20 semi-structured interviews with leaders of state and local land management organizations, and government officials at state natural resource agencies, and contrast their answers with those recorded from 37 interviews of NIPF owners regarding their knowledge and attitudes toward VIPs. Our interviews highlight a critical disconnect between NIPF owner motivations and VIP incentives, as well as misallocated resources for VIP promotion by state agencies, driving low enrollment. At the core, low enrollment in VIPs is generated by inadequate communication between NIPF owners and program managers, along with distrust of government agency objectives. Viewing managers as "street level bureaucrats", civil servants whose job discretion is impacted heavily by available resources, may increase our understanding of the issues plaguing VIPs and help identify improvements to VIP design and implementation.

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“…、生态沟渠 [2] 、人工湿地系统 [3,4] 、生态控草 [5] 、控虫技术 [6] 等，虽然为农业非点源污染控制做出了一定的贡献，但是需要较高的资金支持，效益转化率较低，缺乏推广性；二是从规划、政策和经济等方向提出综合控制方法，例如最佳管理措施制度 [7,8] 、农业水交易税制度 [9] 、生态补偿制度 [10,11] 等，此类方法效果稳定，但是需要多因素配合才能发挥最大效用。通过对景观数量、类型进行合理的空间配置与优化，实现景观功能最大化是生态环境保护十分有效的途径之一。陈利顶等、孙然好等、黄宁等研究表明水环境质量与农业土地利用方式、景观格局具有一定的关系 [12][13][14] 。Bu 等、李明涛等、袁再健等运用不同方法构建了景观格局与水环境质量关系模型，为评价、预测和管理水环境质量提供了依据 [15][16][17] [ 2 ] 陈永高, 张瑞斌. 太湖流域河网水体生态修复工程及其效果 [J].…”

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基于水环境质量控制的高集约化农业景观格局优化研究

李洪庆¹,

Li²,

刘立明³

et al. 2018

zykx

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Farmers, trust, and the market solution to water pollution: The role of social embeddedness in water quality trading

Cited by 37 publications

References 26 publications

Role of Conservation Adoption Premiums on Participation in Water Quality Trading Programs

Role of Conservation Adoption Premiums on Participation in Water Quality Trading Programs

Failure to Communicate: Inefficiencies in Voluntary Incentive Programs for Private Forest Owners in Michigan

基于水环境质量控制的高集约化农业景观格局优化研究

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