Fears as Conscious Perceivings

Laasik, Kristjan

doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9912-2

Philosophia

2017

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9912-2

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Fears as Conscious Perceivings

Kristjan Laasik

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Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

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Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions

Byrne¹

2020

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

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This paper examines the evolution of Husserl's philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl's account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term "signitive" too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/ 14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls "empty" intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl's alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy.

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Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions

Byrne¹

2020

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

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The Origin of the Phenomenology of Feelings

Byrne

2022

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

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This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I present a distinct interpretation of the inception of the phenomenology of feelings. I show that Husserl's first substantial discussion of intentional and non-intentional feelings is not from his 1901 Logical Investigations, but rather his 1893 manuscript, "Notes towards a Theory of Attention and Interest". Husserl there describes intentional feelings as active and non-intentional feelings as passive. Second, I show that Husserl presents a somewhat unique account of feelings in "Notes", which is partly different from his later theories of feelings found in Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory and Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness. In contrast to those mature writings, in "Notes", Husserl describes intentional feelings while avoiding cognitivism and he analyses non-intentional feelings without employing the content-apprehension schema. On this basis, I argue that "Notes" is an important untapped resource for constructing original phenomenologies of feelings.

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Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View

Laasik

2020

PRB

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In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” (CWC) which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The conflicts in question can be regarded as obtaining between different strands of evidence, and our perceptual and emotional experiences can be thus conflicted even among themselves, not only in the special case of a conflict with a judgment.

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Fears as Conscious Perceivings

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions

Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions

The Origin of the Phenomenology of Feelings

Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View

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