Feasibility analysis of content charge by ISPs

Kamiyama, Noriaki

doi:10.1109/itc.2014.6932929

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Only a few articles specifically study the issue of cost sharing between ISPs and content providers. Kamiyama (2014) or Im et al (2016) find that a charge of content traffic by an ISP in competition with another ISP, can have a positive impact on CPs in some cases, however they did not study consumer surplus or welfare. Peitz & Schuett (2016) underline the positive impact of cost sharing on the allocation of traffic and contributes to reduce congestion.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Cost Sharing in Telecommunication Industry, a Virtuous Circle

Jeanjean

2022

SSRN Journal

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Cost Sharing in Telecommunication Industry, a Virtuous Circle

Jeanjean

2022

SSRN Journal

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“…In [1] the authors study the impact of competition between ISPs on network neutrality. Authors in [14] analyze a model with competing ISPs, multiple non-competing CPs and a fixed number of consumers and study the feasibility of imposing side-payments on CPs and its effect on the revenue of both ISP and CP. Other works such as [15] and [16] study the impact of net-neutrality on consumer utility and investments in the network focusing on incremental bandwidth allocation and caching, respectively.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare Analysis of Network Neutrality Regulation

Chaturvedi,

Gopal,

Kaul

2018

Preprint

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Consumers of Internet content typically pay an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to connect to the Internet. A content provider (CP) may charge consumers for its content or may earn via advertising revenue. In such settings, a matter of continuing debate, under the umbrella of net neutrality regulations, is whether an ISP serving a consumer may in addition charge the CPs not directly connected to the ISP for delivering their content to consumers connected to the ISP. We attempt an answer by looking at the problem through the lens of a regulator whose mandate is to maximize the cumulative welfare of ISPs, CPs, and consumers.Specifically, we consider a two-sided market model, in which a local monopoly ISP prices Internet access to consumers and possibly to CPs as well. The CPs then decide whether to enter a competitive but differentiated market and the consumers decide whether to connect to the ISP. Unlike prior works, we model competition between the CPs together with consumer valuation of content and quality-of-service provided by the ISP. We do so by using a novel fusion of classical spatial differentiation models, namely the Hotelling and the Salop models, in addition to simple queue theoretic delay modeling. Via extensive simulations, we show that the equilibrium in the non-neutral setting that allows an ISP to charge a CP welfare-dominates the neutral equilibrium.

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“…These works usually employ game theoretic tools (e.g., non-cooperative game theory and Stackelberg games) to analyze the driving forces the Internet economics evolution [10], to propose new business models [11], [12] and to study different aspects of the problem as, for instance, the impact of competition between ISPs on the network neutrality [13], the feasibility of charging the content providers [14], or even the potential of building new OTT infrastructures exclusively employed for content distribution [15]. However, despite the interesting theoretical conclusions of these works, the observation of the actual progress of the firms would be of great importance, providing us with further insights, as we will see in the following section.…”

Section: ) Existing Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shedding Light on the Internet: Stakeholders and Network Neutrality

Antonopoulos¹,

Kartsakli²,

Perillo³

et al. 2017

IEEE Commun. Mag.

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Abstract-The latest impressive technological advancements in the telecommunications domain have entailed the involvement of new network operators andOver-the-Top (OTT) providers that offer their services over the existing networks. This entry of new stakeholders has changed the Internet dynamics and triggered a long-standing conversation on whether different types of data in the network should be prioritized, also known as the network neutrality debate. On the one hand, OTT providers benefit from the current neutral Internet policy of not discriminating against any application or content in order to transfer their data for free, whereas network providers would like to seize the business opportunity and create revenues by supporting the prioritized delivery of data. In this article, we want to shed some light on the emerging Internet ecosystem and the conflicting interests of its stakeholders. To that end, we first identify the different Internet players and describe their interrelationships. Furthermore, in an effort to offer a new perspective on the network neutrality debate, we propose two novel econometric models that employ recent financial data to capture the relationship between the OTT revenues and the financial gains and investments of the telecommunication operators. Our empirical results provide tangible answers to fundamental questions that had not been answered before, showcasing that OTT and telecommunication providers have aligned interests and their collaboration could be beneficial to both parties.

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Feasibility analysis of content charge by ISPs

Cited by 9 publications

References 17 publications

Fair Cost Sharing in Telecommunication Industry, a Virtuous Circle

Fair Cost Sharing in Telecommunication Industry, a Virtuous Circle

Welfare Analysis of Network Neutrality Regulation

Shedding Light on the Internet: Stakeholders and Network Neutrality

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