Feasibility of Fault Exclusion Related to Advanced RAIM for GNSS Spoofing Detection

Blanch, Juan; Chen, Yu-Hsuan; Lo, Sherman; Innac, Anna; Ferrara, Giorgia; Honkala, Salomon; Bhuiyan, Mohammad Zahidul H.; Thombre, Sarang; Söderholm, Stefan; Walter, Todd; Phelts, R. Eric; Enge, Per

doi:10.33012/2017.15193

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…A significant effort to improve security against different types of attackers, such as GNSS repeaters and spoofers, has been a central focus for both industry and the research community. GNSS vulnerabilities have been investigated in several works, e.g., [1] and [3]- [6], and different countermeasures have been analyzed and evaluated [7]- [16]. Contributions towards protecting GNSS receivers can be divided into two main categories: countermeasures on the receiver side and on the system side.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset Validation

Zhang

Spanghero

Papadimitratos

2020

2020 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS)

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) provide pervasive accurate positioning and timing services for a large gamut of applications, from Time based One-Time Passwords (TOPT), to power grid and cellular systems. However, there can be security concerns for the applications due to the vulnerability of GNSS. It is important to observe that GNSS receivers are components of platforms, in principle having rich connectivity to different network infrastructures. Of particular interest is the access to a variety of timing sources, as those can be used to validate GNSS-provided location and time. Therefore, we consider off-the-shelf platforms and how to detect if the GNSS receiver is attacked or not, by cross-checking the GNSS time and time from other available sources. First, we survey different technologies to analyze their availability, accuracy and trustworthiness for time synchronization. Then, we propose a validation approach for absolute and relative time. Moreover, we design a framework and experimental setup for the evaluation of the results. Attacks can be detected based on WiFi supplied time when the adversary shifts the GNSS provided time, more than 23.942 µs; with Network Time Protocol (NTP) supplied time when the adversary-induced shift is more than 2.046 ms. Consequently, the proposal significantly limits the capability of an adversary to manipulate the victim GNSS receiver.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset Validation

Zhang

Spanghero

Papadimitratos

2020

2020 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS)

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“…Under spoofing attacks, the GNSS position and timing results are unavailable. Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) can suppress one or several spoofed satellites by checking the abnormal residuals in pseudoranges [17], but fails when most visible satellites are spoofed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigation of GNSS Time Synchronization Attacks in a Multicorrelator Receiver

et al. 2022

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are widely used in various fields to provide highprecision timing. However, their low signal power and open signal structure render GNSS receivers vulnerable to time synchronization attacks (TSAs). In this study, we propose a novel single-antenna-based TSA mitigation algorithm. First, a multicorrelator estimator was adopted to calculate the parameters of the authentic and counterfeit signals. Then, the predicted pseudorange was derived for spoofing validation, and the counterfeit signals were subtracted. Finally, a robust extended Kalman filter was adopted to resist gross errors in the estimation results. A series of Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed method with different relative delays and power advantages of the spoofing signals. The Texas Spoofing Test Battery spoofing datasets were used in the experiments to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The results indicated that the timing errors decreased from 2.0 µs (600 m) to 53.4 ns (16 m), and the spoofing signals were considerably mitigated. The proposed anti-spoofing algorithm can ensure the availability of GNSS timing under TSAs and only requires a single antenna, greatly simplifying the GNSS receiver installation and reducing costs.INDEX TERMS Global navigation satellite system (GNSS), multicorrelator receiver, predicted pseudorange, spoofing mitigation, time-synchronization attack (TSA)

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“…As these attacks represent an increasing threat to GNSS users, several anti-spoofing techniques have been proposed over the past years to be embedded into the receiver [7]- [14]. These countermeasures include, among others, spatial signal processing using multiple antennas, signal power monitoring, correlator output monitoring and consistency checks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, a receiver can implement power monitoring and consistency checks (e.g. using a RAIM/ARAIM approach [14]). Such combination enables to detect relatively simple spoofing attacks, which are characterized by an increase in power as well as inconsistencies among the measurements, as only some of them are spoofed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhanced GNSS Authentication Based on the Joint CHIMERA/OSNMA Scheme

Motella¹,

Nicola

Damy

2021

IEEE Access

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The authentication of the navigation signals can be considered as the contribution of the system to the robustness against spoofing attacks and it is becoming an important requirement for a growing number of user communities. GPS and Galileo systems are proposing evolutions of their civil signals to embed features of authentication. For Galileo, the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is integrated in the Galileo E1 OS signal. For the GPS, the Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) solution, designed for the GPS L1C signal, is foreseen to be tested soon.On the other hand, suitable signal processing techniques can be implemented inside the receiver to monitor the quality of the received signals and protect against spoofing attacks. Such techniques shall work as a complement to the authentication strategies, to further increase the signals' robustness. Within this context, the paper presents the Joint Chimera/OSNMA scheme, designed to be adopted by a multi-constellation receiver that already exploits both OSNMA and Chimera enhancements. The idea is to further strengthen the robustness with respect to the individual use of the two solutions, to tackle sophisticated spoofing attacks, which are able to avoid detection from navigation message authentication (NMA) techniques. The manuscript proves the high performance of the joint scheme, presenting the results of a wide bench of tests, under different scenarios of spoofing, and user conditions.

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Feasibility of Fault Exclusion Related to Advanced RAIM for GNSS Spoofing Detection

Cited by 15 publications

References 15 publications

Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset Validation

Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset Validation

Mitigation of GNSS Time Synchronization Attacks in a Multicorrelator Receiver

Enhanced GNSS Authentication Based on the Joint CHIMERA/OSNMA Scheme

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