Federalism and Competing Values in the Reagan Administration

Stability and Contingency in Federalism Preferences

“…Public officials tend to advance federalism arguments in an opportunistic fashion, taking different positions on the benefits of centralization versus decentralization depending on which party controls the federal government (Bulman‐Pozen ; Kincaid , 26). Republican elected officials support decentralization as a general matter; but when Republicans win the presidency, they are prone to centralize policy authority, as occurred on notable occasions during the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations (Conlan , ; Conlan and Dinan ) as well as during the Donald Trump administration (Stratford ). Meanwhile, Democratic elected officials generally support centralization; however, when Democrats are out of power in Washington, D.C., they tout the benefits of decentralizing policy authority (Nathan ), as illustrated by Democratic officials’ embrace of decentralization after Republicans gained control of the presidency and Congress in the 2016 election (Goelzhauser and Rose ; Kettl ).…”

The fiscal pit and the federalist pendulum: Explaining differences between US States in protecting health and the environment

“…Yet it was not notably successful in reducing the total amount of federal regulation. As Conlan (1986) notes, the number of direct order mandates did not substantially drop during Reagan's tenure. Congressional resistance to attempts to deregulate in health and environmental matters remained especially strong.…”

Comparative Inter-Governmental Relations: Models That Need to Travel

“…Conlan (1986) observed that the Reagan presidency tended to favour the interest of national centralising uniformity of regulation when such pressures conflicted with state opposition and, in general, saw the reduction of categorical grants as a means of cutting the federal deficit rather than seriously empowering states and local government. Kincaid (1990) described a much greater tendency in the 1970s and 1980s for the federal government to use regulation rather than fiscal incentives to control domestic policy and devised the term 'coercive federalism' to depict a new approach to inter-governmental relations.…”

“…The tendency towards greater national coercion of federal and local government stems from increasing demands for uniformity in commercial activity and common fairness in welfare distribution from a more mobile globalising society (Posner, 1998: 213-15). Particular interest has also focused on members of Congress and the extent to which they are tending to serve as national representatives rather than spokespersons for local constituents which in turn reflects changes in the structure of the electoral system and political parties (Posner, 1998;Kincaid, 1990;Conlan, 1986).…”