Federalism, gubernatorial power and the incorporation of subnational authoritarianism in Russia: A theory-testing empirical inquiry

Abstract

This article investigates the complex relationship between federalism and electoral authoritarianism by making an empirical inquiry into the structure of incentives that shaped the reform of Russia's regional election laws in [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009]. The idea behind the reform was to make the incumbent governors more manageable and more dependent on the federal authorities. However, the process of its practical implementation largely coincided with Russia's transition to electoral authoritarianism, as a result of which this original intention was reversed by endowing regional authorities with an unrestricted effective power to determine the course of the reform. The main hypothesis of this study is that bounded only by the reform framework, the governors exerted their influence to maximize one of their main assets, the loyalty of the regional assembles. In order to substantiate this hypothesis empirically, a model formalizing the governors' optimization problem is constructed, its possible implications are discussed and their statistical support is examined. The results obtained support the theory according to which electoral authoritarianism, rather than simply suppressing the autonomy of most powerful subnational actors, incorporates them by expanding their effective control over the regional political arenas. The previously existing federal arrangements are instrumental in pursuing this goal.

Gubernatorial Powers in Russia

“…Thus the institutional strengthening of the governors, occurring in parallel with Vladimir Putin's centralization effort, played an important role in solving the problem of credible commitment between the federal center and the subnational elites (Reuter and Remington 2009). This expectation, consistent with a formal argument regarding the role of cooptation of subnational elites in Russia's authoritarian transformation laid down in detail elsewhere (Golosov 2011b;Demchenko and Golosov 2015), places our study into a wider context of ongoing research on authoritarian institutionalism, as an attempt to show empirically how the transformation of institutions occurs as a part of regime change dynamics, and how it matters for the involved actors.…”

“…In the first half of the 2000s, the consolidation of gubernatorial power enabled most of the regional chief executives to control the legislative agendas of their regions (Golosov 2011a). This situation persisted immediately after the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in 2004 because at its initial phase, this reform did not lead to a significant change of power balance in the regions (Sharafutdinova 2010;Demchenko and Golosov 2015). Thus, for most of the 2000-2014 period, the accumulated political strength of the governors could be easily converted into gains in their institutional standing.…”

Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections

“…The council-manager model, previously unknown in Russia, was implanted into the 2003 law on local self-government and emerged as the drafters' preferred model (Golosov et al, 2016;Wollmann and Gritsenko, 2009) because in contrast to the available alternatives, it offered an ultimate solution to the ongoing conflicts between regional governors and city mayors by eliminating the latter office altogether. While the appointed governors lacked the political autonomy from the federal centre enjoyed by them under the system of direct elections, their control over regional political institutions, including the assemblies and municipalities, remained intact and even increased (Demchenko and Golosov, 2016). This policy was promptly described in the local political idiom as building a 'power vertical', that is, a hierarchical spatial organization of power with a single chain of command extending from the federal centre, via regional governors, to the level of municipal government (Ross, 2007).…”

Are Empires Striking Back? A Political and Cultural Comparison of the European Union and Russia

“…Not only has the standard of living risen but the structure of the State has also become closer to its Imperial past than to regular Western nation-states. The country's power has become more centralised than before, with regional governors and even the Federal Duma becoming rubber stamps of Kremlin decisions (Demchenko, Golosov, 2016). The annual television speech by Vladimir Putin (he continued the tradition when Prime minister) has become the sole political programme of the government.…”