Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency Fees

Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems

“…While we focus on the outcome of lobbying in the legislative and judicial sphere, in other contributions this additional stage reflects the decision whether to undertake a potentially harmful activity (Choi and Sanchirico, 2004), whether to disclose information (Farmer and Pecorino, 2005) or an independent lawyer's action (Chen and Wang, 2006).…”

Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment

“…When P raises PA's share of the award, she facilitates surplus-extraction from D, but enhances surplussharing with PA. Choi finds that there is a threshold level of bargaining power for P such that, if her bargaining power is lower (resp., higher), then she should hire (resp., not hire) an attorney. Chen, et. al.…”

Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study

“…Hirshleifer's and Osborne's (2001) contribution discusses sequential investment into the contest and the importance of defendant fault. Chen and Wang (2007) provide a comprehensive model in which the litigation effort decision at the last stage occurs simultaneously. However, as noted above, they only consider the case in which the British rule commands the losing defendant to pay the judgment as well as the contingent fee.…”

“…This implies that ν = 1 and μ = 0. Chen and Wang (2007) put forth that the coexistence of contingent fees and the British rule implies the application of such a rule. If the plaintiff wins her case, then the plaintiff obtains the full judgment J = 1.…”

“…In Regime III, defendants who have lost in court are made to pay the contingent fee agreed upon by the plaintiff and her lawyer. Chen and Wang (2007) assume that this third regime represents the harmonization of contingent fees and the British rule of legal cost allocation. It is clear that Regimes I and III represent polar scenarios of a harmonization of contingent fees and the British rule, while Regime II falls in the middle.…”