Feelings of Being

Ratcliffe, Matthew

doi:10.1093/med/9780199206469.001.0001

Cited by 585 publications

(70 citation statements)

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“…(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012 As this quotation suggests, it can be added that a style of perceptual and practical unfolding is inseparable from diffuse sets of felt bodily dispositions. It is through the feeling body that we experience the significant possibilities offered by our surroundings (Ratcliffe, 2008(Ratcliffe, , 2015(Ratcliffe, , 2017a. To make things clearer, consider more localized feelings of practical confidence.…”

Section: Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And the crucial point is that this structure is susceptible to change. Elsewhere, I have referred to its variants as existential feelings (Ratcliffe, 2005(Ratcliffe, , 2008(Ratcliffe, , 2015. Emotions and moods might be thought of as intentional states with more or less specific contents, such as feeling happy about p, angry about q, scared of r, or in a bad mood about s. That being the case, existential feelings are distinct from both.…”

Section: Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The interpersonal structure of depression

Ratcliffe

2018

Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy

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This paper addresses the manner in which alterations of interpersonal experience are (a) central to most of those predicaments labelled as 'depression', and (b) inextricable from other, seemingly distinct depression-symptoms. I sketch an approach inspired by the phenomenological tradition of philosophy, which emphasizes how depression-experiences involve profound changes in one's sense of possibility. In so doing, I show how anticipated and actual interactions with other people shape and re-shape experience of the wider world by imbuing it with certain distinctive types of possibility. It follows from this that a shift in how one anticipates, experiences, and relates to other people in general also amounts to a shift in the types of possibility offered by the world. My discussion is concerned primarily with the structure of depression-experiences, rather than with causes or treatment. However, I conclude by tentatively addressing some implications for the latter.

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Section: Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The interpersonal structure of depression

Ratcliffe

2018

Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy

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“…In response to this problem, several authors have taken what we might call a phenomenological turn in the philosophy of emotion (Goldie 2000;Helm 2001;Ratcliffe 2008;Slaby 2008;Slaby et al 2011;Schmid 2014bSchmid , 2016Demmerling 2014). Their main claim is that in the case of affective intentionality, the intentional and the phenomenal aspects of a mental state or episode cannot be separated.…”

Section: Cognitivist Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

Thonhauser

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela's concern-based accounts and Schmid's phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features.Keywords Shared emotions . Collective emotions . Affective intentionality . Communal experience . Edith Stein The last decade has seen an emerging debate about the possibility and nature of shared or collective emotions.1 As yet, however, there has been no agreement over precisely what these labels refer to. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotions. Following a preliminary definition, which contextualizes the debate on shared emotions within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I will discuss three major approaches to shared emotions in contemporary philosophical debate. After identifying shortcomings in these approaches and summarizing the elements that need to be accounted for in a multifaceted theory of shared emotions, I will turn to Edith Stein to introduce several suggestions from early phenomenology that can improve current theorizing on shared emotions.

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“…The idea that depressive delusions are preceded by moods and beliefs that are congruent with their content has been put forward in several contexts. For instance, Matthew Ratcliffe (2008), who adopts the Heidegger-inspired term 'existential feelings' to describe what the clinical literature refers to as 'moods' , maintains that existential feelings provide the basis for further experience and thought, including delusional thoughts. Josef Parnas (2013) suggests that depressive delusions deal with the worldly affairs in which patients are engaged and for which they seek evidence.…”

Section: Schizophrenic Delusions Versus Depressive Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%