Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?

Bennouri, Moez; Chtioui, Tawhid; Nagati, Haithem; Nekhili, Mehdi

doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.010

Cited by 401 publications

(428 citation statements)

References 113 publications

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“…Third, for the GMM estimations, the coefficients for the difference in MTB, as a proxy for firm growth prospect, are negative and significant, implying that the future growth prospect of a firm after going through merger reduces the TR of acquirers. Besides, in line with the arguments that more outside board representation increases firm risk by forcing directors to accept risky Net present value (NPV) projects that bring value to shareholders (Bennouri et al, ), we find that higher board independence positively impact TR. This result confirms our prediction that firm in Africa have high institutional, family, and blockholder ownerships that nominate their preventatives to seat on the company boards.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

“…However, the results from the FE show no significant impact of MTB, board independence, and CEO's age on risk. These results support the observation that firm and corporate governance variables correlate little with firm risk and performance variables when FE estimators are used (Bennouri et al, ). In addition, Sila et al () contend that dynamic panel data (as in our case) are endogenous and therefore estimating with FE results in biased estimates, which (Roberts & Whited, ) claim to be the main cause of equivocal results reported in literature.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

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Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

Amewu

Alagidede

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper examines the impact of various executive compensation types on the postmerger risk taking by firm's executives. We find that executive pay influences firm risk differently depending on compensation type and risk measure. Specifically, we find that rewarding executives with cash compensation reduces the total postmerger risk of acquirers. However, managers are motivated to increase systematic risk when they are rewarded with stock‐based incentives. Besides, based on the argument that managerial compensation portfolio might impact systematic and unsystematic risks differently, our findings show no evidence of the impact of executive pay on unsystematic risk.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

Amewu

Alagidede

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Recently, the debate among scholars in corporate finance and accounting has focused on the impact of gender diversity on board proceedings. These studies highlight that gender differences among directors and managers can be explained by differences in their communication skills, decision-making style, level of overconfidence, risk tolerance, diligence, and monitoring intensity (Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012;Adams & Ferreira, 2009;Bennouri et al, 2018;Gul et al, 2011;Gull et al, 2018;Gyapong et al, 2016;Harjoto et al, 2015;Huang & Kisgen, 2013;Huang et al, 2014;Ittonen et al, 2010;Schubert, 2006). The ability to communicate effectively is an important skill for performing well in key managerial positions.…”

Section: Board Gender Diversity and Audit Feesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the variable of interest (PRFEM_BD), the estimate is higher in significance and magnitude. System GMM reduces the risk of biased estimators caused by the heterogeneity effect, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Bennouri et al, 2018;Kacer et al, 2018;Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016;Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). Accordingly, our discussion focuses on the results of the system GMM estimations.…”

Section: Test Of H1a and H1bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Four reasons can be put forward as to why our research is important. First, a major current in the corporate governance literature suggests that female directors are more diligent monitors than male directors, exhibit higher levels of independence, and are more likely to be concerned about shareholder interests (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;Bennouri et al, 2018;Gul et al, 2011;Gull et al, 2018;Gyapong, Monem, & Hu, 2016;Lai et al, 2017). Second, there is a consensus among scholars that female directors tend to be more risk averse and more concerned about ethical issues than men when making organizational decisions (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999;Schubert, 2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gender‐diverse boards and audit fees: What difference does gender quota legislation make?

Nekhili

Gull

Chtioui

et al. 2019

Business Fin & Account

Self Cite

137

135

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We investigate the effect of board (audit committee) gender diversity on audit fees in the French context. We also examine whether the relationship between the proportion of female directors and audit fees is moderated by the enactment of the gender quota law in 2011. We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of French firms listed in the SBF 120 index between 2002 and 2017. Consistent with the supply‐side perspective, we contend that female independent directors and female audit committee members, by improving board monitoring effectiveness, affect the auditor's assessment of audit risk, resulting in lower audit fees. Our findings also document that, by breaking the glass ceiling, the effectiveness of the gender quota law lies not in increasing the proportion of female insider directors, but in boosting the appointment of female independent directors and female audit committee members. Using the difference‐in‐difference approach, our results reveal that female independent directors and female audit committee members are more willing to assert their monitoring skills after the quota law, leading to lower audit fees. Moving beyond tokenism, we show that, after the quota law, the negative impact on non‐audit fees is strengthened only for female independent directors.

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Agency cost: A missing link between female on board and firm performance

et al. 2022

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This research aims to investigate the relationship between the presence of females in the board of directors (BOD) and agency cost as well as firm performance with the mediating role of agency costs. We employ STATA to test feasible general least squares and generalized method of moments (GMM) on Vietnamese listed firms' data over 2015-2019. The results demonstrate that the presence of female directors is positively related to firm performance. The percentage of females has a positive relationship with agency cost, which has a negative impact on firm performance. The mediating role of the agency cost variable only reduces the positive impact of gender diversity in the BOD on firm performance, but this relationship is not reversed. The main contribution is the examination of the moderating role of state ownership and the mediating role of agency costs. Our study provides evidence about women's roles in different legal contexts, which might foster the formation of future legal frameworks.

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Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?

Cited by 401 publications

References 113 publications

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

Gender‐diverse boards and audit fees: What difference does gender quota legislation make?

Agency cost: A missing link between female on board and firm performance

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