Female education, marital assortative mating, and dowry: Theory and evidence from districts of India

Abstract

We study marital assortative mating in education and its relation to dowry in India. There are four main results and contributions of this paper. First, instrumental variable estimates using Indian Human Development Survey-II data suggest existence of positive assortative mating in education levels of husband and wife. Second, this association is weaker in dowry-prominent districts suggesting that in districts with strong patriarchal norms, high dowry transfers could substitute for lower bride's education. Third, we study the independent effect of husband's and wife's education and its interaction on dowry. Estimates suggest that dowry rises with the groom's education and falls with the bride's schooling years. However, the joint effect of husband-and-wife education on dowry is negative, implying that though dowry rises with groom's education, the rate of increase is smaller the more educated the bride is. Finally, to explain the empirical results, we propose a theoretical model of assortative mating in the presence of dowry.

The impact of market integration on arranged marriages in Matlab, Bangladesh

“…There is some evidence that the two key parental investments that allow for the new ‘market integrated’ path to marriage in this setting – investment in dowry and education – may trade off against each other (Goel & Barua, 2021 ; Walker et al, 2008 ; Shenk, 2004 ; Shahidul, 2014 ), but generally speaking parents invest significantly in both. Yet our results show that while investment in a daughter's education is a significant predictor of her husband's status, investment in dowry had only a small, positive and non-significant relationship with husband's status.…”

“…This is probably because education has many collateral effects relevant to arranged marriage. For example, more years of education are accompanied by delays to marriage, increased human capital for women, an increased ability to invest in her own children's human capital (Shenk, 2004 ; Shenk, Towner et al, 2016 ; Goel & Barua, 2021 ), and additional opportunities to meet men who match her socioeconomic status. In contrast, dowry represents a major financial investment that is associated with spouse education – a measure of quality – but may have relatively few collateral effects (although see Shenk, 2007 for a possible positive effect on child outcomes).…”

“…On the other hand, dowries accompany daughters into a marriage. Dowry thus serves as both a direct and indirect investment in the status and resources of the daughter and her children, increases women's bargaining power in her marital family (Shenk, 2007 ; Makino, 2019 ; Goel & Barua, 2021 ) and can be classified as a form of parental investment. In all likelihood, dowries represent aspects of parents’, women's and husbands’ status, thus such interpretations may be hard to distinguish.…”

“…Parents in this context, as in much of South Asia, attempt to weigh investments in daughter's status (e.g. education) against investments in her dowry, wanting to strike the right balance to attract an advantageous marriage (Goel & Barua, 2021 ; Shahidul, 2014 ). The same is not true for sons since he does not take a dowry into marriage with him and thus investments can be channeled fully into increasing his status.…”

Can COVID-19 Lockdown Reduce Crimes Against Women? A District- Level Analysis from India

“…India witnesses on an average 8,000 deaths related to dowry annually. Dowry poses severe constraints to investment in girls' education and health with significant implications for socio-economic outcomes (Goel & Barua, 2021). 3.…”