“Fidelidade Aliancista”: As Alianças Eleitorais Nas Eleições Majoritárias Estaduais E O Caso Do PSB

Resende, Roberta Carnelos; Epitácio, Sara de Sousa Fernandes

doi:10.25160/v6.i1/ga.4

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“…In the Brazilian context, Soares (1964) and Melo (2015) provide an analysis focusing on historic aspects rather than strategic ones. There are also papers that try to explore possible reasons for forming alliances (pragmatism, ideology, or loyalty), but all those attempts do not provide any formal analysis or game-theoretical approach (Krause and Godoi, 2010; Resende and Epitácio, 2017). In addition, with the exception of Resende and Epitácio (2017), the literature focuses only on bloc coalitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A model of electoral alliances in highly fragmented party systems

Griebeler

Resende

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances. Inspired by the Brazilian system—one of the most fragmented in the world—we provide a stylized model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties. Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach, we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leading and the small parties are in terms of ideology, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough to overcome the electoral advantage of the favorite.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%