Field-of-Study Homogamy

Bičáková, Alena; Jurajda, těpán

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2770118

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…However, if we use either a standard Pearson correlation coefficient or standard rank-order statistics that correct for ties, we find no increase in the correlation between husband's and wife's education regardless of whether we use 5,6 or 12 categories of education. Only if we use a rank-order correlation coefficient that does not correct for ties and five categories do we reach the conclusion that the correlation has 1 For an interesting paper about assortative mating by degree program see Bicakova and Jurajda (2016). 2 The finding that the choice of groupings is important is consistent with Eika et al (2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased

Gihleb¹,

Lang²

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not IncreasedDecember 2016 Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9 53113 Bonn, GermanyPhone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA -Institute of Labor EconomicsDiscussion PaPer series IZA DP No. 10413 Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not IncreasedDecember 2016 Rania GihlebUniversity of Pittsburgh and IZA Kevin LangBoston University, NBER and IZA

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased

Gihleb¹,

Lang²

2016

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“…For an interesting paper about assortative mating by degree program seeBicakova and Jurajda (2016).2 The finding that the choice of groupings is important is consistent withEika et al (2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 68%

Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased

Lang

Gihleb

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…For similarity of culture and ethnic background see Rivera (2012'), Currarini, Jackson, and Pini (2010), Boucher (2015), Boyd et al (2003), Hitsch, Hortescu, and Ariely (2010), Fisman et al (2008). For similarity of …eld-of-study amongst college graduates, see Bicakova and Jurajda (2016). For similarity of weight see Schafer and Keith (1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With fully transferable utility (TU), regardless of the distribution of types matching will display positive assortative matching (PAM) if the combined output or surplus of two matched agents is a supermodular function of their characteristics. In the case of homophilic preferences, supermodularity arises if the output q of a matched couple is a concave function of the di¤erence in their types x and y; 7 for example q = jx yj 2 . But even with PAM, whether couples are well matched will depend on the distribution of types.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%