Fighting Corruption While Having Hands Tied: A Case Study of Thailand’s Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission

Abstract

Grounded in 41 semi-structured interviews, this article examines the extent to which the complaints system under regulatory oversight of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) in Thailand has been effective for addressing corruption complaints. The present article revisits the theoretical arguments of the structural school and the reputational school over agency independence, deploying such arguments to analyze the way in which de facto independence of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) operating in a highly politicized environment can be protected. The analysis finds that a high level of legal independence is the best possible way to safeguard de facto independence, enhancing the overall effectiveness of the ACAs working in highly politicized countries. In addition, the empirical findings suggest that a low level of legal independence, a lack of prosecution power, inadequate qualified staffing, and the absence of meaningful public participation are the core factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the PACC system.

Lucky Beneficiaries or Collateral Damage? The Irregular Timing and Arrangement of Chinese Watchdog Agencies

“…ACA studies, many funded by international organizations such as World Bank and Transparency International, primarily center on summarizing successful models and strategies for effectively curbing corruption. These models usually include unrealistic expectations for developing and undemocratic contexts, except for adding another layer of bureaucracy (Asamoah and Ofosu-Mensah, 2018; Prateeppornnarong, 2021; Simelane, 2012). The extant China studies on anti-corruption are preoccupied with either anti-corruption campaigns or formal institutions, the latter of which occasionally serve as object lessons in ACA studies, while factionalism scholarship provides some insights on the target selection of the former.…”

Call for Proposals of Articles for a Special Issue of Public Organization Review (POR) on Public Sector Accountability and Corruption Problems SI #4

“…Even where extensive efforts have been made to address and combat corruption, instances of corruption nevertheless persist (Saddiq & Kessa, 2020 ). These systems can be undermined by staffing issues, a derth of public participation, and lack of follow-through on identified problems, among other concerns (Prateeppornnarong, 2021 ). Perception of corruption is rampant, but misunderstanding about its prevalence is spurred by curtailment of press freedom (Flavin & Montgomery, 2020 ); there is an opportunity to bring in the public, rather than exclude, but how has this been successfully engaged in practice?…”

Return of State Losses in Corruption through Confiscation of Assets Based on Justice (Indonesian Perspective)

“…[7] Second, the criminal loss of independence (imprisonment) will not prevent the committing of a criminal act because the perpetrator can still enjoy the proceeds/benefits of the crime. [8] Third, the confiscation of assets can increase community support and serve as an important message that the government is serious about fighting crime. [9] Fourth, the confiscation of assets is a reflection of supporting the conduct of the war against specific crimes.…”