Fighting Deforestation in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Relevance of the Rome Statute for Rosewood Trafficking in Senegal

Abstract

This article examines rosewood trafficking in the Casamance region of Senegal to determine whether acts of massive deforestation committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict can be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as war crimes of pillage and destruction of property under Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii) of the Rome Statute, respectively. It examines two of the main challenges resulting from the application of these provisions to acts of massive deforestation in the light of the ICC Elements of Crimes. Firstly, the article addresses the delicate issue of the establishment of a nexus between these acts and the related non-international armed conflict. Secondly, it discusses whether natural resources may qualify as ‘property’ for the purpose of Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii). It then offers avenues of reflection regarding the determination of ownership of these resources to fulfil the requirements of the Rome Statute.

Crossing (Conceptual) Boundaries of Transnational Environmental Law

“…A third article, entitled 'Fighting Deforestation in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Relevance of the Rome Statute for Rosewood Trafficking in Senegal', considers the potential of another field of lawinternational criminal lawto protect natural resources and the environment. 46 Pauline Martini and Maud Sarliève note the shortcomings of international criminal law when attempting to prosecute acts of mass deforestation; like Boulot and Sterlin, they lament the anthropocentric nature of the law, noting that the International Criminal Court's 'Rome Statute is an anthropocentric instrument; it was not designed to protect the environment but to protect humankind'. 47 This explains why the Rome Statute 48 does not provide for the prosecution of environmental crimes, except via Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which sets a high threshold, and establishes conditions that are rarely applicable and are restricted to armed conflicts of an international nature.…”

“…47 This explains why the Rome Statute 48 does not provide for the prosecution of environmental crimes, except via Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which sets a high threshold, and establishes conditions that are rarely applicable and are restricted to armed conflicts of an international nature. 49 To circumvent these difficulties, Martini and Sarliève analyze the applicability of the war crimes of destruction of property and pillage. 50 To do so, they use the case study of the non-international armed conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal, involving illegal logging and trafficking of rosewood timber, a species threatened with extinction and protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).…”

“…50 To do so, they use the case study of the non-international armed conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal, involving illegal logging and trafficking of rosewood timber, a species threatened with extinction and protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 51 Throughout their article, the authors emphasize the complexity of assessing whether and how this situation would qualify as a war crime under the Rome Statute, noting, for instance, the absence of clear data on the role of various actors involved in logging and trafficking, 52 and the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between resource exploitation and armed conflict. 53 When thinking about the applicability of the Rome Statute, the authors delve into the notion of 'property', and whether it could encompass ownership of natural resources.…”