Fighting together? understanding bilateral cooperation in the realm of counterterrorism

Perliger, Arie; Milton, D. J.

doi:10.1080/17467586.2018.1517944

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 90 publications

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“…Here we unambiguously obtain > , that is, cooperation will enhance the total number of attacks. 14 Without any loss of generality when 1 > 2 , we get 1 < 1 and 2 > 2 , implying that the inefficient outfit channel will conduct less attacks under cooperation. Since more and more attacks are conducted through efficient channel, the total number of attacks will go up.…”

Section: Case (Iii)mentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Consider the availability of external sponsorship > 0 (measured in units of the consumption). Further, assume that the sponsor commits this fund to be distributed ex post 14 Here = √ 2 √2( + ) and = √ 2 (√ + √ ), hence > because . .…”

Section: Cooperation Under Sponsorshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Sandler (2005) for a discussion on coordination problems which plague international cooperation against transnational terrorism, but do not hinder resolute effort against domestic terrorism; andPerliger and Milton (2018) for a data-driven identification of conditions under which countries may engage in counter-terrorism cooperation 2. SeeThomas (2013) for a discussion on the counter-terrorism opportunities arising from vulnerabilities created as a result of this amalgamation 3.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

Bhan

Kabiraj

2020

Group Decis Negot

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The paper shows that in the absence of external sponsorship, strategic cooperation between two outfits has no impact on terror activity, if neither outfit is resource-constrained a priori. If only one outfit is resourceconstrained a priori, inter-group cooperation increases terror activity if and only if there is sufficient resourceasymmetry between the outfits. Further, if both outfits are resource-constrained a priori, then cooperation may increase or decrease terror activity, depending on parametric asymmetries. Finally, it is demonstrated that while cooperation can neutralize the impact of strategic external sponsorship on terror activity and thereby remove the incentive for its provision, there is always some external sponsorship mechanism which can be utilized to enhance terror activity.

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Section: Case (Iii)mentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Cooperation Under Sponsorshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

Bhan

Kabiraj

2020

Group Decis Negot

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The sense of nations for cooperation. How threat perception and ideology influence counterterrorism cooperation between EU members

Baraldi

2023

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

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Needs or Symbols? The Logic of United Nations Counterterrorism Treaty Ratification

Milton

Jadoon

Warner

2021

International Studies Quarterly

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Why do states commit to UN counterterrorism treaties? This article posits that state accession to UN counterterrorism treaties is likely informed by the nature of the terrorist threats a state faces, and consequently, the pressures that such threats generate from domestic and international audiences on the state to address (or appear to address) them. As such, we hypothesize that states ratify UN CT treaties for either material, needs-based reasons—to gain external assistance for counterterror capacity building—or for symbolic reasons—to visibly signal their commitment to fight terrorism in order maintain legitimacy, and mitigate reputational costs to both domestic and international audiences. To test these hypotheses, we use a newly compiled dataset of state accessions to the 19 UN counterterrorism treaties from 1970–2016, testing both our needs-based versus symbolic hypotheses, as well as more “traditional” explanations for state treaty accession. Across the universe of 19 UN counterterrorism treaties, our study implies that states may be more likely to ratify treaties as mechanisms to signal intent to address terror threats rather than to build threat-specific counterterrorism capacity. This research thus broadens both academic and policy-related understandings of state counterterror treaty ratification.

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Fighting together? understanding bilateral cooperation in the realm of counterterrorism

Cited by 3 publications

References 90 publications

Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

The sense of nations for cooperation. How threat perception and ideology influence counterterrorism cooperation between EU members

Needs or Symbols? The Logic of United Nations Counterterrorism Treaty Ratification

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