Filling the Gaps: Vacancy Chains and Agent-Based Models

Pârvulescu, Radu Andrei

doi:10.31235/osf.io/nehzj

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…judges in 2013, a year that is representative of the magistrate transfer networks after the progressive introduction of the DNA and DIICOT starting in 2002. The data used to create these graphs come from the Romanian Judicial Professions Database (Pârvulescu 2021).The nodes in these graphs represent courts/parquets in one appellate region (e.g. Craiova -CR, which includes Dolj, Gorj, Mehedinţi and Olt counties), while connecting lines signify personnel flows: for instance, how many judges moved between the Craiova and Bucharest appellate regions in 2013, because of promotions, demotions, or lateral transfers.…”

Section: P10 Decoupled Rationalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, and its support by anticorruption protesters(Pojoranu 2017) and political parties unaffiliated with the Social Democrats(Dragoman 2020). 19 SeePârvulescu (2020) for a general treatment of competition and mobility in hierarchical organisations such as civil service bureaucracies. 20 See Section I, article 3 (sub-article 11) of Decision number 11 of the 4 th of May, 2020 of the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice (Întalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie a României 2020) which reaffirms the practice, by reference to magistrate pay schedules in Appendix A of Emergency Ordinance 27 of the 29 th of March 2006 (Government of Romania 2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Decoupled Rationalisation: Judicial Anticorruption and Fragmentation of Parliament and the Magistracy

Pârvulescu¹

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Anticorruption campaigns rely on a promise and ideal of rationalisation: public officials should–and will–behave in an impersonal, rule-governed, and ultimately predictable manner. So why do anticorruption drives often increase political and administrative chaos, instead of decreasing it? In this paper I address this puzzle by analysing the simultaneous effects of judicial anticorruption on both the legislative and judicial spheres. Using the case of Romania from 2005 to 2020, I first demonstrate that the successful drive to jail corruption politicians has increased legislative instability by causing waves of party switching, thereby perforating the political opportunity structure and making space for new, populist political parties. I then show how the new structures of judicial anticorruption have fractured the career lines of judges and prosecutors, while at the same time giving magistrates a reason to weaponise their growing professional heterogeneity as they struggle for control over the new and scarce professional resources brought by the anticorruption drive. This increasing complexity in both legislative and judicial spheres results in ever-growing discursive commitment to rule-following coupled with a decreasing ability to actually follow those rules as the set of veto players becomes increasingly unstable, an outcome that, following institutional theorists in sociology, I term “decoupled rationalisation.”

show abstract

Section: P10 Decoupled Rationalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%