FIMA: Fault Intensity Map Analysis

Ramezanpour, Keyvan; Ampadu, Paul; Diehl, William

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16350-1_5

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Next, we give a list of papers that either evaluate the side-channel and fault resistance of Ascon or elaborate protection mechanisms against side-channel and fault attacks [4,7,12,[28][29][30]50,51,55,60,68,[77][78][79]83].…”

Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

et al. 2021

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Authenticated encryption satisfies the basic need for authenticity and confidentiality in our information infrastructure. In this paper, we provide the specification of Ascon-128 and Ascon-128a. Both authenticated encryption algorithms provide efficient authenticated encryption on resource-constrained devices and on high-end CPUs. Furthermore, they have been selected as the “primary choice” for lightweight authenticated encryption in the final portfolio of the CAESAR competition. In addition, we specify the hash function Ascon-Hash, and the extendable output function Ascon-Xof. Moreover, we complement the specification by providing a detailed overview of existing cryptanalysis and implementation results.

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Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

et al. 2021

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“…Fault Intensity Map Analysis (FIMA) is a recent method introduced by Ramezanpour et al [77] that uses information from fault bias and the correlation between fault distribution and intensity to recover the secret. In general, it combines several existing techniques fault sensitivity analysis (FSA), differential fault intensity analysis (DFIA), ciphertext-only fault analysis (CFA), and statistical ineffective fault analysis (SIFA).…”

Section: Fault Intensity Map Analysis (Fima)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Finalists and Their Fault Analyses

2022

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The security of resource-constrained devices is critical in the IoT field, given that everything is interconnected. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initialized the lightweight cryptography (LWC) project to standardize the lightweight cryptography algorithms for resource-constrained devices. After two rounds, the NIST announced the finalists in 2021. The finalist algorithms are Ascon, Elephant, GIFT-COFB, Grain-128AEAD, ISAP, PHOTON-Beetle, Romulus, SPARKLE, TinyJambu, and Xoodyak. The final round of the competition is still in progress, and the NIST will select the winner based on their and third-party evaluations. In this paper, we review the 10 finalists mentioned above, discuss their constructions, and classify them according to the underlying primitives. In particular, we analyze these ciphers from different perspectives, such as cipher specifications and structures, design primitives, security parameters, advantages and disadvantages, and existing cryptanalyses. We also review existing analyses of these finalists with a specific focus on the review of fault attacks. We hope the study compiled in this paper will benefit the cryptographic community by providing an easy-to-grasp overview of the NIST LWC finalists.

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“…Fault Intensity Map Analysis (FIMA) [RAD19b] builds on and generalizes DFIA and biased-based techniques, such as SIFA. It combines the biased distribution of correct ciphertexts under a correct key hypothesis with the variation of data distribution with fault intensity to reduce the number of faults required to recover a secret key.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It combines the biased distribution of correct ciphertexts under a correct key hypothesis with the variation of data distribution with fault intensity to reduce the number of faults required to recover a secret key. FIMA with neural network key distinguisher (FIMA-NN) [RAD19b,RAD19a] builds upon this, using a neural network to rank key candidates. FIMA has similar disadvantages to SIFA: it requires the ciphertext, and requires guessing 32-bit chunks of the key.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault Injection as an Oscilloscope: Fault Correlation Analysis

Spruyt¹,

Milburn²,

Chmielewski

2020

TCHES

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Fault Injection (FI) attacks have become a practical threat to modern cryptographic implementations. Such attacks have recently focused more on exploitation of implementation-centric and device-specific properties of the faults. In this paper, we consider the parallel between SCA attacks and FI attacks; specifically, that many FI attacks rely on the data-dependency of activation and propagation of a fault, and SCA attacks similarly rely on data-dependent power usage. In fact, these are so closely related that we show that existing SCA attacks can be directly applied in a purely FI setting, by translating power FI results to generate FI ‘probability traces’ as an analogue of power traces. We impose only the requirements of the equivalent SCA attack (e.g., knowledge of the input plaintext for CPA on the first round), along with a way to observe the status of the target (whether or not it has failed and been “muted” after a fault). We also analyse existing attacks such as Fault Template Analysis in the light of this parallel, and discuss the limitations of our methodology. To demonstrate that our attacks are practical, we first show that SPA can be used to recover RSA private exponents using FI attacks. Subsequently, we show the generic nature of our attacks by performing DPA on AES after applying FI attacks to several different targets (with AVR, 32-bit ARM and RISC-V CPUs), using different software on each target, and do so with a low-cost (i.e., less than $50) power fault injection setup. We call this technique Fault Correlation Analysis (FCA), since we perform CPA on fault probability traces. To show that this technique is not limited to software, we also present FCA results against the hardware AES engine supported by one of our targets. Our results show that even without access to the ciphertext (e.g., where an FI redundancy countermeasure is in place, or where ciphertext is simply not exposed to an attacker in any circumstance) and in the presence of light jitter, FCA attacks can successfully recover keys on each of these targets.

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FIMA: Fault Intensity Map Analysis

Cited by 15 publications

References 23 publications

Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

A Review of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Finalists and Their Fault Analyses

Fault Injection as an Oscilloscope: Fault Correlation Analysis

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