Abstract:The current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer restricted to developing economies.After crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default has been advancing. Current debate should take notice of the findings from this literature -an extensive overview of which has been provided in this paper. This paper also discusses the difficulties involved in, but also possibilities of, integrating this type of model in standard business cycle models (RBC and DSGE models). This is likely to be particularly helpful when using models to analyse upcoming issues in the euro area, such as a suitable (sovereign) insolvency law or the assumption of joint liability.
Keywords
Non-technical summaryThe current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer restricted to developing economies.After crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default has been advancing. Current debate should take notice of the findings from this literature -an extensive overview of which has been provided in this paper.The literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default shows that (1) despite the absence of international insolvency legislation, sovereigns have an interest in repaying debt owing to reputational damage and negative output effects; (2) in the event of transitory shocks, debt level is the key factor determining the probability of default; in the event of trend shocks, the output level also plays a decisive role; (3) the political stability of a country reduces its probability of default; (4) bailouts or the possibility of borrowing from international financial institutions such as, for example, the IMF (can) increase the probability of default; (5) fiscal policy acts procyclically if it takes the probability of default and the impact on interest rates into account; (6) taking private sector debt into account does not change the above-mentioned qualitative statements but can increase a government's propensity to borrow (in relative terms); (7) endogenising negotiations about debt recovery rates tends to increase the interest rates on sovereign debt but a government's propensity to borrow can still rise; (8) it can be efficient for borrowers and creditors to delay negotiations over restructuring sovereign debt, although this is heavily dependent on the assumed bargaining game; (9) long-term bonds usually have a higher rate of interest than short-term ones; (10) contagion effects owing to risk-averse investors as well as information shocks affecting investors that impact on the interest rate can even cause fundamentally sound governments to default; and (11) the formal method of solving these models also plays a role in quantitative terms. All of these aspects and the relevant effects that lead to these conclusions are explained in detail in this paper. ...