“…Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that through optimal contracting, executive pay, especially that involving equity/performance-linked compensation, can limit agency problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. However, the recent global financial crisis precipitated by increased risktaking and pay motives of top executives of major banks (Tung, 2010;Aebi et al, 2012;Paligorova, 2011;Lin et al, 2012;Tang, 2012;Polat and Nisar, 2013;Wesep and Wang, 2013) has reignited the debate regarding the effectiveness of executive compensation packages in mitigating agency conflicts in modern corporations (Goering, 1996;Murphy, 1997;Grundy and Li, 2010;Van Essen et al, 2012;Berger et al, 2013;Cook and Burress, 2013). Although a number of papers have examined the link between executive pay and corporate performance, the general conclusion is that the link is weak (Murphy, 1999;Canarella and Nourayi, 2008;Dong et al, 2010;Elsila et al, 2013;Kabir et al, 2013;Tian, 2013).…”