Financial decisions and ownership structure as control mechanisms of agency problems: evidence from Italy

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach The analysis adopts a balanced panel data set of 984 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2013, with estimation using a generalized method of moments. Findings The results appear to confirm both the hypotheses of the alignment of interests and the entrenchment effect. The entrenchment and alignment effects are not found to be alternatives but rather are found to co-exist. The presence of a coalition of minority shareholders acts as a tool to control agency costs, particularly when the coalition is instrumental in the contestability of corporate control. Practical implications These findings suggest that minority shareholders may have a larger impact than previously identified by strategically aligning with other shareholders to form coalitions. This study provides several practical implications. First, dividend payout is not necessarily a good instrument to control and monitor agency costs. This is because the payout can be used to expropriate benefits from the minority shareholders. Second, high ownership concentration does not always reduce agency costs. Third, a non-collusive coalition can be more useful in the monitoring of agency costs than other tools, such as the debt level. Originality/value This study shows that there is considerable value to the firm when individual blockholders come together in a contestable environment and become instrumental in making business decisions. The results support the contention that contestability is an excellent deterrent to dampen the expropriation of benefits to minority shareholders. This study also provides evidence that cash holding can be a good substitute for dividends and debt in the effort to limit agency costs.

Readability, governance and performance: a test of the obfuscation hypothesis in Qatari listed firms

“…In emerging markets, such as Qatar, concentrated ownership, family controlled/owned firms and ruling/royal family shareholdings and membership on the board of directors are common in listed firms. This unique situation can lead to different types of agency problems because of the conflicts of interest between: owners and lenders; owners and managers; majority and minority shareholders; and powerful directors that exercise “self-control” for their personal advantage (Schulze et al , 2001; Chrisman et al , 2004; Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006; Hassan, 2018; Rossi et al , 2018). …”

“…powerful directors that exercise “self-control” for their personal advantage (Schulze et al , 2001; Chrisman et al , 2004; Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006; Hassan, 2018; Rossi et al , 2018).…”

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