Financial disclosure policy in an entry game

Darrough, Masako N.; Stoughton, Neal M.

doi:10.1016/0165-4101(90)90048-9

Cited by 752 publications

(425 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…However, when private information loses its strategic nature, this old fear is substituted by indifference, which changes the sign of the relationship (Harris, 1998). This sign continues to be the same despite the fact that indifference is replaced by the incentive to avoid overproduction (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). And finally, when the sector is clearly at its stage of maximum maturity, it is able to anticipate the significant information which makes voluntary disclosure irrelevant, generating managers' indifference once again (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Botosan and Harris, 2000;Hann, 2007 andLi, 2010) as it also argues against the initial negative relationship. Emmanuel and Garrod,1987Darrough and Stoughton, 1990Verrecchia, 1990Wagenhofer, 1990Feltham and Xie, 1992Darrough, 1993 Hayes and Lundholm, 1996…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are two groups of articles which are the cornerstones of this research. First of all, the four papers in bold in Figure 1 (and later included afterwards in Figure 2): three are theoretical (Verrecchia, 1983;Darrough and Stoughton, 1990;Clich and Verrecchia, 1997) and one is a test (Harris, 1998). In a static context, these four papers could all seem to be against.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In spite of the competitors' increasing capability to forecast relevant information in the sector over the three stages, the components of the sector must still release private information regarding the generalized absence of good news and thereby avoid overproduction (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990;Feltham and Xie, 1992).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The strategic importance of private information (Verrecchia, 1983), the necessity of informing rivals to avoid overproduction (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990), and the ability of competitors to forecast relevant information (Backer and McFarland, 1968) are the factors that modulate the sign of the slope between competition and voluntary disclosure. The successive changes in intensity of these strengths throughout a industry's lifetime produce a non-monotonic function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure

Nickel

Gago‐Rodríguez

2010

SSRN Journal

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We analyze how, in the absence of capital market incentives, the influence of existing competition on voluntary disclosure is an evolving process which has a non-monotonic design.The progressive capability of rivals to forecast significant information and the increasing losses of abnormal profits during the industry life cycle generate fears and incentives that change the sign of the relationship between competition and the probability of voluntary disclosure throughout the industry's development. We support this new design empirically by applying a semi-parametric Cox model to 28 years of archival data for the entire Spanish newspaper sector.We also find that the best fitting model is the first harmonic of a Fourier series.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure

Nickel

Gago‐Rodríguez

2010

SSRN Journal

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International Business

Noi¹

2012

What's Your MBA IQ™?

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Explanatory Factors of Integrated Sustainability and Financial Reporting

2012

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The complexity of the business world has led to growing demands being made of companies regarding the information provided on their financial performance, corporate governance and contribution to developing sustainability. In response, some leading companies have begun to publish integrated reporting, in the form of a document providing a coherent summary of this information, thus facilitating stakeholder engagement.This paper examines the validity of the hypotheses of the theories of agency and of signalling, and analyses the political costs and those borne by owners in voluntarily developing this new type of business document. More specifically, in order to determine their prevalence among the suggested reasons for these paradigms, we analyse the effect of industry concentration, together with other factors, in the development of integrated reporting.The analysis of a non-balanced sample of 1590 international companies for the years 2008-2010, in which a logistic regression methodology is applied to panel data, reveals the negative impact of industry concentration on the development of a more pluralist report, simultaneously taking into account stakeholders, sustainability and the long-term viewpoint, as well as questions of responsible investment, business ethics and transparency. Copyright

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Financial disclosure policy in an entry game

Cited by 752 publications

References 22 publications

Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure

Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure

International Business

Explanatory Factors of Integrated Sustainability and Financial Reporting

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