Financial exclusion as a consequence of counter-terrorism financing

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the unintended consequences, financial exclusion, of counter-terrorism financing regulations in terms of their impact on financial inclusion and, consequently, the creation of an ineffective counter-terrorism financing framework. A further aim is to make recommendations to mitigate these unintended consequences. Design/methodology/approach This subject is examined by using the practices of a range of countries and organisations. The interdisciplinary approach of the paper is highlighted, which comprises criminal law, banking law, international law and human rights law. Findings Financial exclusion is a focal point that results in ineffective counter-terrorism measures which are caused mostly by the formal financial sector, in particular, the banking system. The financial exclusion also leads to counter-productive counter-terrorism financing through a low risk-appetite, de-risking, de-banking, financial exclusion and using unregulated or less-regulated and supervised financial systems. Originality/value No article comprehensively analyses financial exclusion as a consequence of counter-terrorism financing framework. The paper examines the process of counter-terrorism financing regulations, which leads to financial exclusion. In addition, the impact of financial exclusion on all relevant actors, such as individuals, correspondent banking relationships, money and value transfer services, charities and virtual currencies, is examined.

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Time will tell: Defining violence in terrorism court cases

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“…Hesap açmak için kimlik ve ikametgâh kanıtı gereklidir. Birçok göçmen işçi bu tür belgeleri sağlayamamaktadır (Malakoutikhah, 2020;Elmi ve Ngwenyama, 2020).…”

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