2018
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12226
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Financial Flexibility and Manager–Shareholder Conflict: Evidence from REITs

Abstract: Using equity Real Estate Investment Trust data, we show empirically that the use of unsecured debt, which contains standardized covenants that place limits on total leverage and the use of secured debt, is associated with lower leverage outcomes. We then show that firm value is sensitive to leverage levels, where lower leverage is associated with higher firm value. In the presence of weak managerial governance, our results suggest that unsecured debt covenants function as a managerial commitment device that pr… Show more

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Cited by 34 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…We attribute the effect to likely be due to decreased credit rationing by banks, as we find no statistically significant relationship between the degree of public debt and leverage levels, i.e. finding no evidence to support debt capacity hypothesis, which is true for US REITs (Riddiough and Steiner, 2018). Additionally, our test for a possible sign of overinvestment problem did not support the notion of existence of such.…”
Section: Introductioncontrasting
confidence: 66%
“…We attribute the effect to likely be due to decreased credit rationing by banks, as we find no statistically significant relationship between the degree of public debt and leverage levels, i.e. finding no evidence to support debt capacity hypothesis, which is true for US REITs (Riddiough and Steiner, 2018). Additionally, our test for a possible sign of overinvestment problem did not support the notion of existence of such.…”
Section: Introductioncontrasting
confidence: 66%
“…Existing papers are generally silent on the roles of debt capacity on capital structure decisions. In the case of REITs, for instance, Harrison et al (2011) assumed that high debt ratio is an indication of high debt capacity while Riddiough and Steiner (2018) related high debt ratio with low debt capacity. 4 As pointed out by Lemmon and Zender (2010) these assumptions are prone to misclassification of firms with large debt capacity but high current leverage as being financially flexible or firms with small debt capacity but little or no leverage as being financially constrained.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See, for example, Riddiough and Steiner (), who argue that limits to takeovers in EREITs leave shareholders vulnerable to managerial conflicts of interest. The study focuses on shareholder‐manager conflict over unused debt capacity, and finds that covenants contained in the unsecured debt that limit managerial discretion over unused debt capacity are valuable for EREIT shareholders.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%