Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior

Abstract

Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas in conservation, played across Europe, Africa, and Asia. We find, across this range of dilemmas, that while payments can encourage pro-conservation behavior, they often fail to capitalize on the potential for jointly improving productive and environmental outcomes, highlighting the more nuanced challenge of reconciling livelihoods with conservation goals. We further find production (yield) and the joint production-environment product (i.e., a measure of agricultural production multiplied by a measure of pro-conservation practice) are better preserved in groups that are more educated, more gender diverse and that better represent women. We discuss how the design of incentive programs can better align livelihood and environment goals.

Grounding United States policies and programs in soil carbon science: strengths, limitations, and opportunities

“…Investment in the underlying social and technical infrastructure is also required. Simultaneous investments should be made in research, technical assistance, and market development, as a multi-pronged approach can address structural challenges and extend conservation efforts beyond short-term funding cycles (Bell et al, 2023). Furthermore, funding should be directed towards incentives for emerging and experimental practices.…”

Conventional vs modern: which approach is better for the success of agricultural cooperatives?

“…If this is not done, mistakes in governance often lead to multiple interpretations, including administrative management. Imperfections in market fragmentation provide practical lessons for family farms in Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania, Gabon, Scotland, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Ghana about the "incentive trap" (Bell et al, 2023;Heyl et al, 2022;Ragasa et al, 2018). For comparison, a survey in Greece examined the differences in profitability performance between two cooperative identities, namely capital-seeking cooperatives in the food sector and traditional agricultural cooperatives (Kontogeorgos et al, 2018).…”

“…-Cooperatives based on their membership: (1) school cooperatives, (2) Republic of Indonesia employee cooperatives (2) scout cooperatives, (3) women's participation cooperatives, (4) employee cooperatives, (5) market traders cooperatives, (6) batch cooperatives land, (7) student cooperatives, (8) Islamic boarding school cooperatives, and (9) village unit cooperatives; -Commodity-based cooperatives: (1) service cooperatives, (2) mining cooperatives, (3) industrial and handicraft cooperatives, (4) livestock cooperatives, and (5) agricultural cooperatives.…”