Financial inclusion, natural disasters and energy poverty: Evidence from China

Yin, Zhichao; Wang, Rui; Wu, Xi

doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106986

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Following Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Yin et al. (2023), the instrumental variable is the “proportion of other large-scale farmers in the village who are constrained by liquidity, except for the i th farmer”.…”

Section: Discussion On Endogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Yin et al (2023), the instrumental variable is the "proportion of other large-scale farmers in the village who are constrained by liquidity, except for the ith farmer". In biprobit models (1) and (2), the F values of weak instrumental variable tests are greater than 10, indicating that the instrumental variable is related to the endogenous variable.…”

Section: Discussion On Endogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subjective preferences, liquidity constraints and price risk management under large-scale farm management

Peng,

2023

CAER

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PurposeLarge-scale farm management in China has developed rapidly in recent years. Large-scale farmers face substantial operating risks, requiring extensive price risk management. However, the agricultural insurance and futures markets in China are incomplete. This study aims to analyze the price-risk-management behaviors of large-scale farmers under incomplete market conditions, with a focus on the interconnections between large scale farmers' subjective preferences (risk preferences, time preferences), liquidity constraints and their price risk management.Design/methodology/approachThe authors construct an analysis framework to reveal the impact of large-scale farmers' risk preferences, time preferences and liquidity conditions on their price-risk-management behaviors under incomplete market conditions. Using data from field surveys and subjective preference experiments involving 409 large-scale grain farmers in China, an empirical analysis was conducted using the bivariate probit model.FindingsThe results show that risk-averse farmers will use risk transfer (such as contract farming) and risk diversification (such as multi-period sales) to avoid price risk. However, farmers subject to liquidity constraints and strong time preferences will not choose risk diversification, and the interaction between time preferences and liquidity constraints will strengthen this decision. The larger the farm-management scale, the greater the impact.Originality/valueThe authors focus on rapidly developed large-scale farm management in China. Appropriate price risk management is required by large-scale farmers due to their substantial operating risks. Considering the incomplete conditions of agricultural insurance and futures markets, the results of this study will help identify behavioral characteristics of large-scale farmers and optimize their price-risk-management strategies, further stabilizing large-scale farm management.

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Section: Discussion On Endogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussion On Endogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%