Financial Market Regulation and the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion

The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies

“…This finding provides empirical support to a wide variety of literature in recent years which has emphasized the striking absence of civil society voices in financial regualtory policymaking (Scholte, 2013;Helleiner & Porter, 2010;Mügge, 2010, p. 9;Mooslechner et al, 2006). This limited mobilization of civil society groups has important and unexpected consequences on where existing interest group pluralism actually ends up coming from.…”

“…Existing literature on financial industry power emphasizes not only the resources that the financial industry can deploy to shape the content of regulatory policies but also the fact that it frequently finds itself relatively uncontested. Many have lamented in this context how the involvement of civil society organizations has been sporadic and weak when it comes to financial regulation (Scholte, 2013;Helleiner & Porter, 2010;Mügge, 2010, p. 9;Mooslechner, Schuberth, & Weber, 2006), and the lack of countervailing forces has reinforced the "unchecked might of global finance" (Anheier, 2014). Such depictions of the financial regulatory policymaking environment has not remained uncontested, as a variety of case studies have highlighted how financial industry groups have been facing opposition from outside as well as within the financial industry since the crisis (Kastner, 2014;Clapp & Helleiner, 2012;Pagliari & Young, 2014;Young, 2012;Helleiner & Thistlethwaite, 2013).…”

Tipping the Balance

“…As Halliday and Carruthers (2009, p.15) (Pagano & Volpin 2001, p.503;Stratmann 2002;Rajan & Zingales 2003;Mooslechner et al 2006). The same interest-based approach also prevails in sociological enquiries, where it is argued that law manifests the most influential groups' interests, viewing financial law-making as either a conflict of 'politically connected elites' (Fligstein 2002, p.210) or 'struggles among professions' over their regulatory domains (Carruthers & Halliday 1998, p.54, emphasis in original).…”

Arbeitnehmerkapital, Finanzmarktregulierung und Geldpolitik

“…Zwar gibt es, wie gezeigt, satzungsgemäße und informelle Vertretung von Arbeitnehmerinteressen in einigen Aufsichtsgremien. Dabei handelt es sich aber meist um Überbleibsel aus korporatistischen Traditionen; die gegenwärtigen Trends der Finanzmarktregulierung scheinen eher auf eine Ausgrenzung von Arbeitnehmern und anderen Interessengruppen hinzudeuten (Mooslechner et al 2006). Grenzüberschreitende Finanzmärkte (insbesondere im Derivatehandel) werden von nationalen Regulierungsbehörden bestenfalls partiell kontrolliert.…”