Financing Security Through Elite Taxation: The Case of Colombia's “Democratic Security Taxes”

Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: The Case of Uganda

“…In the end, as long as these individuals remain compliant, their relationship with the URA and government should be one of partnership, working together to ensure that compliance is improved on the one hand, and 28 government is made accountable for taxes on the other hand. In Colombia, the government was successful in imposing a security tax on elites primarily because of three reasons: (a) fiscal and economic conditions in the country, which dictated that the government declare a state of emergency requiring the adoption of a tax decree; (b) solidarity and cohesion between government and business elites; and (c) improved perceptions that the government was in position to account for the taxes through the provision of security (Flores-Macías 2012).…”

Civil War, Institutional Change, and the Criminalization of the State: Evidence from Guatemala

“…However, they are unable to explain alternative accounts, which find that internal conflict can have "statebuilding" effects. Slater (2010), for example, finds that when domestic conflict is "endemic and unmanageable," it prompts elites to forge "protection pacts," which facilitate state extraction (See also, Stanley 1996;Flores-Macías 2014;Rodríguez-Franco 2016). Prevailing theories are thus unable to capture the divergent state development processes that can occur during internal conflict and their distinct effects on revenue extraction.…”

“…Though classic studies found that war "made the state" by facilitating taxation (Tilly 1975), intrastate conflict is instead associated with more mixed findings. Cross-national analyses have identified a robust negative correlation between civil war and tax capacity (Besley and Persson 2008;Thies 2010); however, other studies note that internal conflict can also bolster state extraction (Slater 2010;Flores-Macías 2014Rodríguez-Franco 2016).…”

De ficción a realidad: drones y seguridad ciudadana en América Latina

“…Primero explicar a las poblaciones qué se está haciendo y cómo, puede afectar a la eficacia de la herramienta (la opacidad facilita seguir actuando con un tiempo de adelanto). Segundo, cuanto más se sepa más presiones habrán para regular, teniendo las normas restrictivas un coste de oportunidad muy alto para los posibles usos que aún no se dan pero podrían surgir, reduciendo el dinamismo que hay en las políticas de seguridad en la región (Rodgers, 2013) y planteando el debate de la financiación cuyos esquemas ya han sido modificados en países como Colombia (Flores-Macías, 2013).…”