Finding the “odd one out”: Memory color effects and the logic of appearance

Abstract

Can what we know change what we see? A line of research stretching back nearly a century suggests that knowing an object's canonical color can alter its visual appearance, such that objectively gray bananas appear to be tinged with yellow, and objectively orange hearts appear redder than they really are. Such "memory color" effects have constituted the strongest and most complete evidence that basic sensory processing can be penetrated by higher-level knowledge, and have contributed to theories of object perception in psychology, neuroscience, and even philosophy. Are such phenomena truly perceptual? Or could they instead reflect shifts in judgments and responses without altering online color perception? Here, we take a novel approach to this question by exploiting a "logic" that is inherent in visual processing but that higher-level cognition often cannot follow. In four experiments spanning both classical and contemporary work, we exhaust the predictions of memory color theories by exploring scenarios where memory color accounts make tortuous hypotheses that would be difficult for subjects to grasp, but that should be easily accommodated by visual processing. We show that such conditions eliminate or even reverse memory color effects in ways unaccounted-for by their underlying theories-especially in a novel "odd one out" paradigm that may help distinguish visual appearance from higher-level judgment in a powerful and general way. We suggest that prior knowledge can influence color judgments in real and robust ways, but that such influences may not truly reflect changes in visual appearance per se. We further discuss the general utility of this approach for isolating perception from judgment, both for memory color effects and beyond.

Examining the Role of Familiarity in the Perception of Depth

“…This kind of often-used explanation is likely to have introduced a publication bias [6,[79][80][81][82] into studies on the effect of familiarity on the perception of depth and distance, as well as into studies on the effect of familiarity on the perception of other modalities (e.g., size, color). The conclusion we draw from our study is that all prior studies purporting to support a familiarity effect should be reviewed carefully and then reconsidered [16,83]. Funding: This manuscript was prepared as a result of a project "Visual perception in our everyday life" within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University) in 2019 (grant № 19-04-006) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project «5-100».…”

Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border

“…One complication is that these empirical claims are hotly contested (Gross et al., 2014; Stokes, 2013; Valenti & Firestone, 2019), and the philosophical consequences depend on how they are resolved. If there is no cognitive penetration whatsoever (Firestone & Scholl, 2016), this concern gains no traction.…”

“…& Firestone, 2019), and the philosophical consequences depend on how they are resolved. If there is no cognitive…”

Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness

“…45 For arguments for the related view that perceptual learning result in justified beliefs see Lyons (2011) andChudnoff (2017). 46 For discussions, see Macpherson (2012), DeRoy (2013), Zeimbekis (2013), Gatzia (2017), andValenti andFirestone (2019).…”