2009
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03013-0_9
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Fine-Grained Access Control with Object-Sensitive Roles

Abstract: Abstract. Role-based access control (RBAC) is a common paradigm to ensure that users have sufficient rights to perform various system operations. In many cases though, traditional RBAC does not easily express application-level security requirements. For instance, in a medical records system it is difficult to express that doctors should only update the records of their own patients. Further, traditional RBAC frameworks like Java's Enterprise Edition rely solely on dynamic checks, which makes application code f… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…It has been used to create several interesting typecheckers not anticipated during its design. For instance, in addition to the pluggable type systems presented in this article, recent work by Fischer, Marino, Majumdar, and Millstein [2009] used JAVACOP to implement static checking for a parameterized, role-based access control system that supports fine-grained access policies. The type system includes a form of dependent types and effect checking and makes use of JAVACOP'S dataflow framework to incorporate flow-sensitive reasoning.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…It has been used to create several interesting typecheckers not anticipated during its design. For instance, in addition to the pluggable type systems presented in this article, recent work by Fischer, Marino, Majumdar, and Millstein [2009] used JAVACOP to implement static checking for a parameterized, role-based access control system that supports fine-grained access policies. The type system includes a form of dependent types and effect checking and makes use of JAVACOP'S dataflow framework to incorporate flow-sensitive reasoning.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…This article presents the results of our experiences with four qualitatively different pluggable type systems in JAVACOP . Other uses of JAVACOP have been described elsewhere, including a pluggable type system to enforce safe memory management in the real-time specification for Java [Andreae et al 2006a]; a pluggable type system to enforce fine-grained access control policies [Fischer et al 2009]; and a pluggable type system to enforce safety-critical software standards that has been used by the JSR 302 working group on Safety Critical Java Technology [JSR 302 2006].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Then, RMI Proxy Objects are generated in accordance with the established access control policies (they contain the authorized methods only). Fischer et al [16] present a more fine-grained access control, which uses parameterized Annotations to assign roles to methods. These approaches, in contrast with our concept, do not facilitate the access to a relational database because the developers still need to have full knowledge of the database schema and also the authorized accesses to database objects.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We use this Java property to allow hierarchization of roles. Beyond extending the role Role_IRole_A, Role_IRole_B1 comprises two Business Schemas: i_orders (9-10) and s_customers (15)(16). The first Business Schema manages one CRUD expression identified by i_orders_I_Orders_withCustomerID (line 11-12) and the second manages s_customers_S_Customer_all (line 17-18).…”
Section: B Policy Extractormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, a typechecker ensures that annotations and code are consistent at compiletime. For example, Object-sensitive Role Based Access Control (ORBAC) [29] uses a typechecker to enforce the security policy that a user cannot read confidential data of other users unless their roles allow him to do so. However, ORBAC does not handle object hierarchy and the role-based protection is not propagated to children objects, although the children may represent confidential data.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%