Fine’s Trilemma and the Reality of Tensed Facts

Abstract

Fine (2005Fine ( , 2006 has presented a 'trilemma' concerning the tenserealist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: 'presentism', '(external) relativism', and 'fragmentalism'. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine's tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call 'dynamic absolutism'. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine's trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable.

Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change

“…But if the dynamic absolutist chooses this solution, then she cannot rightfully claim to endorse REALISM-for now it certainly seems that reality's being constituted by tensed facts is ultimately a matter of there being certain 'tenseless' facts about what tense-aspect what property has at what time. If 10 See Loss (2018) for another argument against dynamic absolutism that is distinct from, but related to, the argument presented in this section. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this paper to my attention.…”

“…2 In their (2011), Correia and Rosenkranz use the label absolutist anti-recurrentism for this view. 3 For critical discussion of Fine's argument, see Deng (2012), Tallant (2013), Cameron (2015: 86-102), Lipman (2015), Savitt (2016), Loss (2017Loss ( , 2018, and Deasy (2018). 4 Cf.…”

The Situationalist Account of Change

“…Kit Fine's fragmentalism (in his 2005 and2006, and explored in a small literature including Lipman (2015Lipman ( , 2016, Loss (2017Loss ( , 2018 and Simon (forthcoming)) is a view which bears significant similarities to the situationalism I'm presenting. Fragmentalism is a view which allows perspectival facts to be taken seriously without metaphysical privilege being given to one perspective.…”

“…Mention of dialethic fragmentalism brings us to Loss (2017) (see also his ( 2018)). Loss's version of fragmentalism denies the principle of adjunction, that the truth of p and of q entails the truth of 'p and q'.…”

“…The idea that reality might not all be 'of a piece' has been explored in different ways in different contexts. One example is in Fine's (2005Fine's ( , 2006 fragmentalism, with more recent papers from Lipman (2015Lipman ( , 2016, Loss (2017) and Simon (forthcoming) developing versions of the view. Moore (1997Moore ( , 2019) also explores the possibility that reality is disunified.…”