Finishing START and Achieving Unilateral Reductions: Leadership and Arms Control at the End of the Cold War

Baglione, Lisa A.

doi:10.1177/0022343397034002002

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Our study has important policy implications for the field of arms control. While other works have examined the PNIs (Baglione 1997; Cohen 1997; Bunn and Holloway 1998), we believe that the PNIs have received less scholarly attention than they warrant. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is weakening, in large part because the nuclear weapon states—especially the United States and Russia—have not taken sufficient steps to cut their nuclear arsenals (Scheinman 2005).…”

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confidence: 77%

“…Even though the United States had salient security interests at stake in achieving joint nuclear reductions, neither realism nor neorealism can explain why the United States chose the strategy it (Baglione 1997). The PNIs unilaterally reduced the U.S. arsenal, offered no guarantees of reciprocation, and had no verification measures, which is inconsistent with the power‐based logic.…”

Section: Discussion Of Competing Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Realizing the importance of minimizing bias, we use a large variety of sources in order to obtain the most accurate picture of what sparked the PNIs and why 5 . Four categories of documents informed our research: speeches and interviews given by key decision‐makers (Bush 1991a,b; Cheney 1991a,b; Lott 1991; Wolfowitz 1991); declassified data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE); the memoirs written by key players (Baker 1995; Powell 1995; Gates 1996; Bush and Scowcroft 1998); and secondary sources that shed light on internal deliberations within the U.S. government (McManus 1991; Santos 1991; Yang 1991; Beschloss and Talbott 1993; Baglione 1997; Cohen 1997; Wittner 2003).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…23 23 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this alternative argument to our attention. Baglione (1997) contends that domestic politics provide a partial explanation for arms control during this period, but explains the PNIs in terms of a changed threat perception upon the part of Bush after the coup, which deemphasized the threat of the Soviet state and focused instead on the potential dangers created by its nuclear arsenal’s insecurity. …”

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confidence: 99%

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Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Fuhrmann

Early²

2008

Foreign Policy Analysis

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In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which were unilateral measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet ⁄ Russian nuclear arsenals to date. Despite their eventual success, the United States took on significant risks in launching the PNIs. To uncover the best theoretical explanation for their onset, this article uses realism, neorealism, the bureaucratic politics model, expected utility theory, and prospect theory to generate ex ante predictions regarding nuclear arms control at the end of the Cold War. It then tests the theories' predictions against the empirical record. The results suggest that a focus on an individual decision maker-President Bush-is necessary to fully understand the PNIs and that an explanation rooted in prospect theory offers the most explanatory power. This study speaks to an important debate in discipline regarding the significance of individuals, while underscoring the value of exploring foreign policy decision making from multiple levels of analysis. It also advances the literatures on risk acceptance and prospect theory by shifting their applications away from militarized conflict and crises to diplomatic negotiations and cooperation.

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confidence: 77%

Section: Discussion Of Competing Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Fuhrmann

Early²

2008

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Rüstungskontrolle ohne Verträge?

Heinrich

2020

Z Friedens und Konflforsch

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ZusammenfassungDie vertragsbasierte nukleare Rüstungskontrolle steht gegenwärtig vor enormen Herausforderungen. Besonders in Südasien konnten auf Verträgen beruhende und verbindliche Steuerungsansätze bisher nicht etabliert werden und zu einer Verlangsamung der Aufrüstung und zur Stabilisierung der Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Kernwaffenstaaten Indien und Pakistan beitragen. Gleichzeitig wird in der Literatur unverbindliche und informelle Rüstungskontrolle als potentielle Alternative nur begrenzt reflektiert, was mit Blick auf die Forschung zu informellen Ansätzen verwundert. Ausgehend von diesem Befund schlage ich eine Fokussierung auf die in den 1960er Jahren entwickelte gradualistische Strategie vor. Mein Argument ist, dass diese einen Beitrag zur Stabilität zwischen Indien und Pakistan leisten kann. Für diesen Zweck wird ein Analyserahmen entwickelt, der sowohl konkrete Anwendungsbereiche als auch Kriterien und Bedingungen für die gradualistische Strategie offenlegt. Der Aufsatz liefert somit nicht nur spezifische Ideen und Impulse für Rüstungskontrollansätze in Südasien, sondern bietet auch Anknüpfungspunkte für Arbeiten zu anderen regionalen Zusammenhängen und trägt so zu einer Erweiterung der Rüstungskontrollperspektive bei.

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The Evolution of International Security Studies

2009

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International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, 'new agenda' or critical.

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Finishing START and Achieving Unilateral Reductions: Leadership and Arms Control at the End of the Cold War

Cited by 4 publications

References 11 publications

Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Rüstungskontrolle ohne Verträge?

The Evolution of International Security Studies

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