Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions

Abstract

Finland has decided to remain militarily non-aligned, although the country has been willing to develop defence cooperation inside the EU and a partnership with NATO. In fact, it is the only EU country bordering Russia that is not a member of NATO. The question of Finland's NATO membership has been discussed in public since the end of the Cold War, and the debates have intensified with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia's confrontation with the West. At the same time, Finland has been keen on deepening its partnership with NATO, engaging in an 'enhanced partnership' and signing a Host Nation Support agreement with the Atlantic Alliance. Despite the intensified discussion, it is nevertheless unlikely that there will be a swift decision to apply for full NATO membership. Finland's current relationship with NATO has evoked a great deal of international interest recently, in light of the increased tensions between the Alliance and Russia that have become palpable in the Baltic Sea

Finland's NATO membership: Continuous shelter‐seeking strategy

“…At the same time, the purpose of neutrality had now assumed a more singular meaning, specifically modified for security policy purposes only; on one hand, neutrality was channelled into military elements, resulting in a new policy of military ‘nonalignment’, yet, on the other, it was purposefully diminished in economic and social issues in favour of European and Western shelter. In effect, the policy of military ‘nonalignment’ included an explicitly stated ‘option’ to join NATO should circumstances call for such a change (Forsberg, 2018).…”

“…In other words, and perhaps paradoxically, the treaty solidified Finnish‐Soviet relations, translating into increased trust, which ultimately allowed Finland to implement neutrality as its policy of choice. Finland's own commitment to the policy of neutrality, and the pursuit of foreign policy on the periphery of great power politics, ultimately provided Helsinki with ‘space’ and leverage to approach the West under the banner of a neutral state (Forsberg, 2018) Indeed, if Finland's shelter‐seeking behaviour is examined within this ‘space’, one which finds itself outside the scope of the pragmatic, arguably necessitated Soviet‐leaning security policy, a more nuanced picture emerges. This perspective is often buried under notions of unilateral obedience to Soviet interests, perhaps comparable to the influence imposed on the Warsaw Pact countries.…”

“…The Government Report on Security Policy in 1995 stated that ‘Finland will not seek new defence solutions’, but ‘if the international environment changes essentially, Finland will reconsider its security choices in the light of this development’. Similar phrasing was used in security and defence policy formulations in 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2012 and 2016 (Forsberg, 2018).…”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine selectively depolarized the Finnish NATO discussion on Twitter

“…Behind this major change in opinion, the rising external threat seems to have had a depolarizing effect on the Finnish NATO discussion. For long, Finnish opinions on NATO embodied a polarization that was largely partisanship-based: voters of the main rightwing party (National Coalition) were largely in favor of joining, whereas voters of left-wing parties were the most vocal opponents of NATO [3]. After the invasion, however, many left-wing supporters changed their opinion, and eventually the Finnish parliament almost unanimously voted in favor of joining NATO (188 for, 8 against).…”

Fear of the Russian bear? Negotiating Finnish national identity online

“…Nevertheless, the echoes of these historical paradigms—as well as the general history of close relations between large and small neighbouring countries in the Russian borderland region—have shaped relations between Russia and Finland in the post‐Soviet Putin era. This is visible in continuous discussions on whether Finland will join NATO, which is a core issue to understand and analyse in Finland's relation with its neighbours (Cottey, 2018; Forsberg, 2018; Koch & Vainikka, 2019).…”