Firm Control

Abstract

How has the Xi Jinping administration recentralised authority over China's politics and economy? Studies of Xi's rule often suggest that his "core leader" status, revolutionary heritage, and informal network of loyalists underpin this consolidation of central control. In contrast, this article focuses on the state sector to highlight how the Xi administration's recentralisation of authority is grounded in existing governance mechanisms and techniques: central leading small groups, the cadre management system, Party committees, and campaigns. Using policy documents and an original dataset on central state-owned enterprise leaders, I provide evidence that the Xi administration has leveraged each of these four methods to reclaim central authority relative to the preceding Hu Jintao administration. These findings contribute to scholarship on adaptive authoritarian governance and economic reform in China by underscoring that administrations can use existing instruments of central control in divergent ways.

Report on China’s shipbuilding industry and policies affecting it

“…a strategic and large conglomerate. 341 As stated by Ch. Zhang, all SOEs in China represent about 23%-28% of China's GDP and between 5% and 16% of China's total employment.…”

“…Some important SOEs in the shipbuilding and marine equipment sector The second type enjoy the same hierarchical level as departments. 345 CSSC, CSIC (and all their subsidiaries) resort under the first category. The other SOEs of the abovementioned list fall under the second category.…”

State-owned enterprises in the shipbuilding sector

“…At first glance, this trend to increase political control in central SOEs' governance systems seems at odds with China's mixed ownership reform, which includes a tendency to push SOEs towards an increasing level of economic liberalisation, including more autonomy for a SOE's top management. 62 However, a high degree of management control by itself is no reason for concern as one would have to assess what the control is used for, as well as under which corresponding circumstances the control will be exerted. If political control tends to overshadow commercial decision making, there may be an unjustified interference in the corporate decision making process.…”

“…The CEO of CSIC from 2015 up to the merger with CSSC in 2019 was transferred from the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and also acted as Party Committee Secretary. 67 On the website of one of CSIC's subsidiaries a referral is made to a speech by the former CEO of CSIC. The tools to achieve the Regulations' objectives consist of:…”

Editorial

“…Another development is the further extension of Party control over Stateowned enterprises (SOEs) (Leutert 2018), and to a lesser degree over private and foreign enterprises (Zhang's article in this issue). As Zhang argues, while the Party had always used its political power to wrestle market institutions, the Xi government has been most concerned that control over the economic sectors, the SOEs in particular, may be slipping from its control.…”