Firm exit and armed conflict in Colombia

Camacho, Adriana; Rodríguez, Catherine

doi:10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii053

Cited by 28 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Third our paper, contributes to the literature on the economic impacts of armed conflict (see Abadie andGardeazabal, 2003, Guidolin andLa Ferrara, 2007;Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013;and Serneels and Verpoorten, 2015for examples and Brück et al, 2013and Blattman and Miguel, 2010 for literature reviews on this topic). We contribute to this group of studies by focusing our analysis on the impacts of IDP migration caused conflict within a state.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…However, these controls are available for the largest municipalities that host the bulk of the economic activity in Colombia. The same reduction in our sample occurs for the estimates presented in Tables II and III. 18 For instance, Camacho and Rodriguez (2013) uses the same sample to study the effect of conflict on firm exit. The authors find that a one-standard deviation increase in the number of guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in a municipality increases the probability of plant exit in 5.5 percentage points or .28 SD.…”

Section: V1 Effects On Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Informality Good for Business?

Rozo¹,

Winkler

2019

J. Human Resources

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This paper examines the effects of large inflows of internally displaced persons (IDP), who are primarily absorbed by the informal sector, on the behavior of formal manufacturing firms in Colombia. To identify causal effects, the analysis employs annual, firm-level panel data between 1995 and 2010 and exploits that when conflict intensifies, forcefully displaced individuals tend to migrate to municipalities where people from their origin locations settled earlier. The paper finds that large inflows of IDP induce sizable, negative effects on the intensive and extensive margins of production of formal firms. These effects are stronger for firms operating in sectors that face a stronger competition from the informal economy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: V1 Effects On Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Informality Good for Business?

Rozo¹,

Winkler

2019

J. Human Resources

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show abstract

“…Third our paper, contributes to the literature on the economic impacts of armed conflict (see Abadie andGardeazabal, 2003, Guidolin andLa Ferrara, 2007;Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013; and Serneels and Verpoorten, 2015 for examples and Brück et al, 2013 andBlattman andMiguel, 2010 for literature reviews on this topic). We contribute to this group of studies by focusing our analysis on the impacts of IDP migration caused conflict within a state.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Is Informality Good for Business? The Impacts of IDP Inflows on Formal Firms

Rozo

Winkler

2019

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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“…This leads some commentators to suspect a "conspiracy" or "racket" between insurers and criminals (Clendenin, 2006;The Times, 2012). Yet, when crime rates or the cost of resolution rise and insurance premia go up, or the crime is unpleasant, firms (and individuals) avoid the risks instead (Camacho & Rodriguez, 2013). Profit-maximizing insurers therefore should not treat crime as exogenous.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing criminal markets: The role of private insurers in kidnap for ransom

Shortland

2017

Governance

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The intersection between the formal and criminal economies presents a range of intractable coordination and enforcement problems. Who orders and facilitates the interactions between private, legal entities, and criminals (potentially) engaged in kidnap for ransom? I analyze the contracts, protocols, norms, and agencies created by insurers to govern this unusual market. Stringent insurance contracts, effective security measures, and orderly resolutions create a profitable market for kidnap insurance. Underwriters manage moral hazard and adverse selection. Business risk consultancies minimize the kidnapping of insured workers, high‐net‐worth individuals, and travellers. Crisis responders ensure that hostages are treated well, keep ransoms moderate and stable, and discourage kidnappers from reneging on agreed ransoms. The state, private sector, and mafias incentivize cooperation and enforce contracts. Understanding this complex polycentric governance architecture is crucial for remedying current trends in “terrorist” kidnap for ransom.

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Firm exit and armed conflict in Colombia

Cited by 28 publications

References 14 publications

Is Informality Good for Business?

Is Informality Good for Business?

Is Informality Good for Business? The Impacts of IDP Inflows on Formal Firms

Governing criminal markets: The role of private insurers in kidnap for ransom

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