Firm-Led Malaria Prevention in the United States, 1910-1920

Abstract

In the absence of capable government services, a railroad company in Texas and multiple cotton mills in North Carolina successfully prevented malaria in the early twentieth century. This Article looks through the lens of economics to understand how and why people had the incentive to privately coordinate malaria prevention during this time, but not after. These firms, motivated by increases in productivity and profit, implemented extensive anti-malaria programs and used their hierarchical organizational structures to monitor performance. The factors underlying the decline of private prevention include a fall in the overall rate of malaria, the increasing presence of the federal government, and technological innovations that lowered exposure to mosquitoes. Understanding how, why, and when firms can prevent diseases has important implications for current disease policy, especially where governments, international organizations, and technologies are not enough.

Decentralized response as a pandemic second‐best: The case of Russia

“…For instance, investment in relevant sanitary and health infrastructure may be lucrative due to improvements in property values. Carson (2016, 2020, p. 154) shows that American firms in the early 20th century realized that private control of malaria‐spreading mosquitoes increased the value of nearby land and property, thus encouraging more investment in disease prevention to reap the corresponding benefit. Even non‐profit agents such as charities may also have strong incentives to not engage in opportunistic behavior.…”

“…The studies of Geloso and Murtazashvili (2020), Boettke and Powell (2021), Leeson and Rouanet (2021) and Leeson and Thompson (2021) add insights to the public choice dimension of disease management. Insights by Carson (2016, 2020) help understand the possibility of private involvement in pandemics. Toelstede (2019) uncovers the dynamics of political predation in pursuit of state efficiency.…”

Pandemics, economic freedom, and institutional trade-offs

“…The eradication of typhoid fever, like other waterborne diseases, depends on large-scale investments in infrastructure, in particular water-purification technology. Water purification loosely fits with the notion of a public good, though it could be privately provided, depending on the technology for excluding people from its use (Carson, 2016 , 2020 ; Troesken, 1999 ). 7 Combating typhoid fever by investing in water treatment technologies has substantial benefits in terms of educational attainment and earnings later in life that justify the costs of adopting the technology (Beach et al, 2016 ).…”

The FDA and the COVID‐19: A political economy perspective

“…Trosken (2015) finds that federalism and secured property rights provided much of the United States with effective infrastructure to mitigate the spread of yellow fever, typhoid fever, and smallpox from 1850 to 1950. Similarly, Carson (2016) notes private firms underwent various efforts to prevent malaria spread during the early 1900s when state‐efforts were either poorly provided or unprovided. Candela and Geloso (2021) and Geloso and Pavlik (2019) find comparatively higher amounts of economic freedom are associated with quicker economic recovery after pandemics.…”