Firm performance and CEO turnover: the moderating role of CEO attributes

Chijoke‐Mgbame, Aruoriwo Marian; Boateng, Agyenim; Mgbame, Chijoke Oscar; Yekini, Kemi C.

doi:10.1108/cg-04-2022-0190

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 104 publications

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Section: Research Design and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most previous studies have found clear evidence of a negative association between CEO changes and corporate income performance, although they were not focused on the analysis of forced CEO turnover across multiple countries. Some works have focused on analyzing CEO changes in a single country, regardless of the turnover cause (Rachpradit et al, 2012;Visintin et al, 2015;Huang et al, 2020;Ghosh et al, 2021;Chijoke-Mgbame et al, 2023). Other studies have examined companies in multiple states but did not distinguish between voluntary and forced CEO changes (Defond and Hung, 2004;Lel and Miller, 2008;Hu and Kim, 2019).…”

Section: Conceptual Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have not considered subsequent years to avoid the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic from 2019 onwards on the data, especially concerning the choice to retain or replace the CEO, as done in similar previous studies (Chijoke-Mgbame et al, 2023). This is also considering that, with reference to the years affected by the effects of the pandemic, CEOs cannot reasonably be held accountable for any negative economic outcomes in the same way as it can occur in normal periods.…”

Section: Sample and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of investor protection on forced CEO turnover

D’Alauro,

Quagli,

Nicoliello

2024

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Purpose This paper aims to analyze the direct and indirect effects of investor protection on forced CEO turnover. Design/methodology/approach The authors investigate 5,175 firm-year observations from 16 European countries over 2012–2018, collect data on four national investor protection indicators, identify 196 forced CEO turnovers and use multiple logistic regression models. Findings The results show that a reduction in the degree of investor protection significantly increases the probability of a forced change of the company’s CEO. Furthermore, when the degree of investor protection increases, directors are attributed a lower degree of responsibility in the event of a decline in earnings performance. Therefore, the relation between a decrease in profitability and a forced change of CEO is reduced. Research limitations/implications The research is focused on countries belonging to the European Economic Area and most of the investor protection indicators are derived from surveys. Concerning policy implications, the findings suggest that regulators should focus on the effective enforcement of investor protection mechanisms. Social implications The results confirm that characteristics at the country level have an impact on corporate decisions, highlighting the importance of increasing the degree of investor protection as a means of mitigating agency conflicts and improving stewardship. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study explores a relatively underinvestigated topic as it uses investor protection indicators to jointly evaluate both direct and indirect effects on forced changes of CEO through cross-national research.

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Section: Research Design and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%