Firm‐Sponsored General Training

Balmaceda, Felipe

doi:10.1086/425435

Cited by 29 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…protection against low probability and high cost events. 5 However, in contrast to these papers, our paper delves deeper into the incentives 4 Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2005) document a discrete increase in the use of health care corresponding to the onset of Medicare eligibility at age 65. 5 The recent introduction of health savings account (HSA) in part breaks the link between consumption and insurance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…First, the focus 8 See Hashimoto (1981) for an analysis of the determination of how speci…c human capital investment will be shared by the worker and the employer. 9 However, recent papers by Balmaceda (2005) and Kessler and Lülfesmann (2006) showed that under some surplus sharing rules the speci…c and general human capital will endogenously interact so that even the labor market is competitive, the employer may choose to contribute to workers'general training. 1 0 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) consider many potential forms of market frictions, including search friction, asymmetric information, complementarity between general and speci…c skills, etc.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, it seems plausible to suspect that Medicare availability at age 65 leads individuals to delay more costly health expenditure after they turn 65. 4 [ Figure 1 About Here]…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Inefficiencies in Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence

Fang¹,

Gavazza²

2007

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We investigate how U.S. employment-based health insurance system a¤ects health care decisions. We stress that health is a form of human capital that a¤ects productivity on the job and we suggest that the current U.S. system might lead to an ine¢ cient low level of individual health due to employees' turnover. Turnover in frictional labor markets creates an externality that limits employer' and employee's ability to privately capture the full bene…ts of health investments.Moreover, we show that under-investment in health is positively related to the turnover rate of the workers'industry and increases medical expenditure in retirement.We provide empirical evidence for the predictions of the model using two data sets, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In MEPS, we …nd that employers in industries with high turnover rates are much less likely to o¤er health insurance to their workers. When employers o¤er health insurance, the contracts have higher deductibles and employers'contribution to the insurance premium is lower in high turnover industries. Moreover, workers in high turnover industries have lower medical expenditure and undertake less preventive care. In HRS, instead we …nd that individuals who were employed in high turnover industries have higher medical expenditure when retired. We also evaluate and cast doubt on alternative explanations.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Inefficiencies in Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence

Fang¹,

Gavazza²

2007

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“…10 The assumption that the disutility of effort is measured in the same units as nominal wages is implicitly made in the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and more recently by Davis and Harrigan (2011). 11 Contract incompleteness of human capital investments has been used to explain firm-provided training (Balmaceda, 2005;Casas-Arce, 2006). I regard the assumption of contract incompleteness as a fact of life, and do not complicate the model by discussing its underpinnings.…”

Section: Production Technology Incomplete Contracts and Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Labor market institutions, firm-specific skills, and trade patterns

Tang

2012

Journal of International Economics

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JEL classification: F10 F12 F14 F16 L22 J24 Keywords: Labor market institutions Margins of trade Trade patterns Firm-specific skillsThis paper studies how a country's labor market institutions, by affecting workers' skill acquisition, can shape its export patterns. I develop an open-economy model in which workers undertake non-contractible activities to acquire firm-specific skills on the job. In the model, labor market protection raises workers' incentives to acquire firm-specific skills relative to general skills, turning labor laws into a source of comparative advantage. In particular, the model shows that countries with more protective labor laws export relatively more in firm-specific skill-intensive sectors at both the intensive and extensive margins. To test the theoretical predictions, I construct sector proxies for the firm-specific and industry-specific skill intensity by estimating returns to firm tenure and industry tenure for different U.S. manufacturing sectors during the 1974-1993 period. By estimating sector-level gravity equations for 84 countries using the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein (2008) framework, I find evidence supporting the predicted effects of labor market institutions at both margins of exports.

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“…12 After the investment costs are incurred by both parties, the employer and the employees of a …rm bargain over the division of expected surplus. At the time of bargaining, the employer's outside 1 0 For instance, contract incompleteness of human capital investment has been used as an explanation for …rm-provided training in studies by Balmaceda (2005) and Casas-Arce (2006). 1 1 As discussed in Stole andZwiebel (1996a and1996b), …rms have a strategic incentive to overemploy workers if the technology has decreasing returns to scale.…”

Section: Production Technologies and Market Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Labor Market Institutions, Firm-Specific Skills and Trade Patterns

Tang

2010

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies how cross-country di¤erences in labor market institutions shape the pattern of international trade, focusing on workers' skill acquisition. I develop a model in which workers undertake non-contractible activities to acquire …rm-speci…c skills on the job. In the model, workers have more incentive to acquire …rm-speci…c skills relative to general skills in a more protective labor market. When sectors are di¤erent in the dependence on these two types of skills, workers'skill acquisition turns labor laws into a source of comparative advantage. By embedding the model in an open-economy framework with heterogeneous …rms, sectors with di¤erent levels of dependence on …rm-speci…c skills, and countries with varying degrees of labor protection, I show that countries with more protective labor laws export relatively more in …rm-speci…c skill-intensive sectors through both the intensive and extensive margins of trade. I then estimate returns to …rm tenure for di¤erent U.S. manufacturing sectors over the period of [1974][1975][1976][1977][1978][1979][1980][1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993], and use the estimates as sector proxies for …rm-speci…c skill intensity to test the theoretical predictions. By implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein (2008) framework to estimate sector-level gravity equations for 84 countries in 1995, I …nd supporting evidence for the predicted e¤ects of labor market institutions on both margins of trade.

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Firm‐Sponsored General Training

Cited by 29 publications

References 20 publications

Dynamic Inefficiencies in Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence

Dynamic Inefficiencies in Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence

Labor market institutions, firm-specific skills, and trade patterns

Labor Market Institutions, Firm-Specific Skills and Trade Patterns

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