First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

Budde, Maximilian; Minner, Stefan

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.03.007

Cited by 25 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Li and Scheller-Wolf (2011) concluded that a push contact is preferable for the buyer when there are many suppliers and the demand is high, while the pull contract becomes more attractive when the demand is more variable and the unit cost of the supply is high. Budde and Minner (2014) extended the setting of Li and Scheller-Wolf (2011) in the FPA environment with risk aversion. They concluded that a risk-averse retailer always prefers FPA rather than SPA for a pull contract.…”

Section: Auctions and The Newsvendor Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Lorentziadis

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

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Section: Auctions and The Newsvendor Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Lorentziadis

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…They show that channel efficiency is higher in a pull contract than in a push contract. Budde and Minner (2014) study the sourcing problem of a newsvendor‐like retailer who purchases from multiple suppliers. They point out that only the pull contract can bring about supply chain coordination.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To resolve this dilemma, supply chain finance (SCF) has emerged as an effective remedy. SCF provides feasible and reliable financing sources for SMEs to mitigate the shortage of capital in which well‐funded agents along with supply chains essentially share the risks of capital‐constrained agents (Kouvelis and Zhao, 2012; Cai et al., 2014; Yang and Birge, 2018). For example, under delayed payment (i.e., trade credit), the upstream manufacturer undertakes some or even all demand risk of the downstream retailer in a push contract (Chen and Wang, 2012; Kouvelis and Zhao, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment

Yang

Fang

Zhang

2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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This work focuses on a two‐level supply chain with a pull contract, where the retailer acts as a leader and the capital‐constrained manufacturer as a follower who undertakes the inventory risk. In the presence of demand uncertainty, the manufacturer is risk‐averse, and the risk is measured by the semideviation method. To finance the capital‐constrained manufacturer, we investigate two collaborative supply chain finance schemes: retailer's early payment (EP) financing and retailer investment (RI) financing. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production quantity and the retailer's wholesale price under EP and RI. Under the two financing schemes, the manufacturer obtains a higher utility when his risk aversion degree is moderate, while the retailer is worse off in the presence of a higher risk aversion degree. Under RI, both optimal production quantity and wholesale price decrease in the proportion of dividends shared by the manufacturer. For the manufacturer (or the retailer or the total supply chain), we derive the associated parameter region in which RI achieves a higher performance than EP. When RI and EP are available, there exists a common parameter region in which RI is preferred by the manufacturer, retailer, and total supply chain.

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“…David et al (2006) generalized Che's results to the case with more than two quality attributes, and showed that the buyer's expected payoff in the first-score, second-score, and English auctions differ only by a predefined constant. Budde and Minner (2014) considered a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing from a set of suppliers with private cost information. They compared combinations of different reverse auction formats (the first-and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (pull and push) under full contract compliance with a risk-neutral retailer and risk-averse suppliers.…”

Section: -4mentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

Xiang

Zhang

Cheng

et al. 2019

Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.

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Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

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First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

Cited by 25 publications

References 31 publications

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment

Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

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