First Practical Side-channel Attack to Defeat Point Randomization in Secure Implementations of Pairing-based Cryptography

Jauvart, Damien; Fournier, Jacques; Goubin, Louis

doi:10.5220/0006425501040115

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If Bob loses the device where e(U, d B ) is executed, then an attacker can control the input U which is manipulated. The flaw that we present here comes from paper [22] which describes in details the technical aspects.…”

Section: Aimed Targetmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [22] the authors show that the naive correlation search scheme does not result in a successful attack.…”

Section: Attack Schemes Against a Protected Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In view of the results given in Figures 12 and 13, the number of curves needed to find a 32-bit word is: 2 We improve the efficiency of the attack when compared to [22] where 300 curves were necessary to perform the attack Given that there are 7 other 32-bit words to be found, the total number of traces is:…”

Section: Fig 11: Correlations Related To a Vertical Correlation Collmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Improving side-channel attacks against pairing-based cryptography

Jauvart¹,

Mrabet

Fournier

et al. 2019

J Cryptogr Eng

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Side-channel attacks are a serious threat against secret data involved in cryptographic calculations, as for instance pairing-based cryptography which is a promising tool for the IoT. We focus our work on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack against a pairing implementation. We improve a vertical sidechannel analysis attack and propose the first horizontal attack against a pairing implementation. First, we present a characterization of the multiplication that allows us to reduce by a factor of ten the number of side-channel traces required in order to perform a CPA attack against an implementation of Ate pairing. Secondly, we successfully attack the same implementation with only one trace by using the first horizontal attack path against pairing-based cryptography.

show abstract

Section: Aimed Targetmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [22] the authors show that the naive correlation search scheme does not result in a successful attack.…”

Section: Attack Schemes Against a Protected Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fig 11: Correlations Related To a Vertical Correlation Collmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Improving side-channel attacks against pairing-based cryptography

Jauvart¹,

Mrabet

Fournier

et al. 2019

J Cryptogr Eng

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In view of the results given in Figures 12 and 13, the number of curves needed to find a 32-bit word is: We improve the efficiency of the attack when compared to [22] where 300 curves were necessary to perform the attack Given that there are 7 other 32-bit words to be found, the total number of traces is: 6.5 Some ideas for extra protections The scheme for this attack does not depend on the configuration for the secret point, whether it is P or Q. The only aspect which comes into play is the choice of the pairing, and more exactly from the choice of the groups G 1 and G 2 .…”

Section: Fig 11: Correlations Related To a Vertical Correlation Collmentioning

confidence: 99%