First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees

Flamini, Francesca

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.007

Cited by 20 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The idea is that once a certain amount of investment in time and money is made, the sunk-cost fallacy affects negotiators and they feel obliged to pursue negotiating (Balakrishnan, Patton, & Lewis, 1993). Game-theoretical analyses likewise suggest that ''one should bargain on 'easy' issues first if implementation is sequential (Flamini, 2007). Doing so builds 'bargaining momentum' .…”

Section: Obstacles Hinder Constructive Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting stuck or stepping back: Effects of obstacles and construal level in the negotiation of creative solutions

Dreu

Giacomantonio

Shalvi

et al. 2009

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Section: Obstacles Hinder Constructive Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting stuck or stepping back: Effects of obstacles and construal level in the negotiation of creative solutions

Dreu

Giacomantonio

Shalvi

et al. 2009

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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“…Similarly, in the context of a divorce settlement, negotiations over the ownership of a home are more likely to impact the status quo than discussions over the ownership of a car. Given that most negotiations involve multiple issues, an important question that arises with respect to forming a negotiating agenda is the order in which to address the different issues (Flamini, 2007; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). One approach is to address various disputed issues simultaneously in order to maximize the possibility of mutually beneficial (i.e., integrative) trades across each issue (Busch & Horstmann, 1997; Inderst, 2000).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One approach is to address various disputed issues simultaneously in order to maximize the possibility of mutually beneficial (i.e., integrative) trades across each issue (Busch & Horstmann, 1997; Inderst, 2000). Nevertheless, human cognitive limitations make sequential bargaining—where negotiators address the various issues in some sequence—a more realistic possibility, and such bargaining tends to be the norm in practice (De Dreu et al, 2009; Flamini, 2007; Lang & Rosenthal, 2001). Here, we examined sequential negotiations, with issues varying in status quo consequentiality.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating power: Agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts.

Kteily¹,

Saguy²,

Sidanius³

et al. 2013

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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In this research, we investigated how group power influences the way members of groups in asymmetrical conflict approach intergroup negotiations. Drawing on theories of negotiations and of intergroup power, we predicted that group power would interact with features of the proposed negotiating agenda to influence willingness to come to the table. Based on the negotiation literature, we focused on 2 types of sequential negotiation agendas: 1 beginning with the discussion of consequential issues before less consequential issues (consequential first) and 1 leaving the discussion of consequential issues until after less consequential issues are discussed (consequential later). Because they are motivated to advance changes to their disadvantaged status quo, we expected low-power group members to favor consequential first over consequential later invitations to negotiate. High-power group members, motivated to protect their advantage, were expected to show the reverse preference. Converging evidence from 5 experiments involving real-world and experimental groups supported these predictions. Across studies, participants received an invitation to negotiate from the other group involving either a consequential first or consequential later agenda. Low-power group members preferred consequential first invitations because these implied less stalling of change to the status quo, and high-power group members preferred consequential later invitations because these invitations seemed to pose less threat to their position. Theoretical and practical implications for negotiations research and conflict resolution are discussed.

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“… See Lang and Rosenthal (2001),Bac and Raff (1996),Inderst (2000),Busch and Horstmann (1999b),Busch and Horstmann (1999a),Flamini (2007),Chen and Eraslan (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%