First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File: International Patent Law Harmonization and Innovation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Terms of use: Documents inThe U.S. has been under pressure to abandon the unique first-to-invent feature of its patent law for awarding patents. The opposition to reform however argues that switch to a first-to-file rule, the international norm, will undermine innovation. We evaluate this argument in a dynamic stochastic model of a patent race. The result generally supports the opposition's argument. JEL Classification numbers: L3, O31,O34Keywords: first-to-file, first-to-invent, patent law harmonization, innovation, U.S. patent law, First-to-invent versus first-to-file:International patent law harmonization and innovation Abstract: The U.S. has been under pressure to abandon the unique first-to-invent feature of its patent law for awarding patents. The opposition to reform however argues that switch to a firstto-file rule, the international norm, will undermine innovation. We evaluate this argument in a dynamic stochastic model of a patent race. The result generally supports the opposition's argument.

A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Procedures

“…One of their findings is that that first‐to‐file accelerates discovery of the final innovation relative to first‐to‐invent. In contrast, Miyagiwa () examines the tradeoff for an inventor between losing a patent because a rival receives the patent first, and duplicating rival research effort when the rival has already invented. The author develops a model of a patent race with private information, and finds that a first‐to‐invent standard induces as least as much R&D effort as first‐to‐file.…”