Should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in non-competitive sectors? Or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders? We develop a theoretical model to answer these questions which are normative. The analysis focuses on the governments' trade-off between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in the privatization reforms that occurred in non-competitive sectors. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests and public subsidies are eliminated. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of a price rise for consumers. We show that, in developing countries where budget constraints are tight, privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries. However for more profitable industries, privatization and price liberalization are suboptimal.Finally, once a market gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership.