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AbstractFiscal policy and net capital inflows in developing countries are procyclical. A large amount of literature has examined this phenomenon and explored its consequences for aggregate fluctuations. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are an important source of external finance for governments and hence play a key role in financing the execution of fiscal policy. The literature has found evidence that government borrowing from MDBs is countercyclical, but how are MDB flows related to fiscal policy? Does this relationship depend on whether the government is running a deficit or a surplus, or would this relationship change if the sovereign is going through a fiscal crisis? Do the differences in the scope and corporate structure between MDBs translate into different disbursement patterns? Beyond their impact to foster development in recipient countries, understanding the behavior of MDB flows is important to assess their contribution to macroeconomic stability. This paper answers these questions studying the co-movement of sovereign lending from MDBs with government expenditure and with private sovereign lending in different fiscal policy stances and during fiscal crises. The paper finds that multilateral sovereign lending is correlated with government expenditure, and that this correlation does not change if the government is running a surplus or a deficit. When considering total MDB lending, this comovement holds even in fiscal crises. Finally, the paper finds evidence of synchronization between multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund during fiscal crises. JEL codes: F21, F34, F41, F44, F53